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Risk analysis and risk assessment are becoming more and more relevant for practical 
applications and have received an increasing importance in research and development. 
The application of risk analysis and risk assessment has been more highlighted in 
recent years and is considered at different levels in the industries. Nowadays, new 
technologies are rapidly growing, and new risks must be considered in the risk 
assessment. Bridges and wind turbines are two types of infrastructures where their 
failures can lead to severe damages, and thereby a high risk. Hence, rational decisions 
are needed to reduce their risk.  
This Ph.D. project is part of the EU Marie Sklodowska-Curie project INFRASTAR. 
The aim of INFRASTAR (Innovative and Networking for Fatigue and Reliability 
Analysis of Structures Training for Assessment of Risk) project is to develop 
knowledge, expertise, and skill for optimal and reliable management of structures. 
Along with that, the objective of this Ph.D. project is to develop methods for risk 
assessment for wind turbines and bridges. This Ph.D. study includes a case study on 
a composite bridge and several case studies considering different risk assessment 
scenarios on wind turbines (wind turbines near a highway throwing off ice and blades 
and power stage utilized in wind-fuel cell hybrid energy systems). 
Methods that are already available and used in bridges and wind turbines, such as risk-
based decision-making, are modified and adapted to make it possible to use them as 
decision support tools for Operation and Maintenance (O&M) activities for the case 
study of the bridge. In addition to risk-based O&M methodologies, available 
methodologies to model the consequences of adverse events are modified based on 
existing risk assessment methodologies for wind turbines, such as Failure Mode and 
Effect Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Decision Tree, and finally 
Bayesian Network (BN). These methods are demonstrated in different case studies 





Risikoanalyse og risikovurdering er i stigende grad relevant for den praktiske 
implementering og er ligeledes af større betydning inden for forskning og udvikling. 
I de seneste år er anvendelsen kommet i større fokus og tages i betragtning på 
forskellige niveauer inden for forskellige industrigrene. Nye teknologier udvikles med 
større hastighed, og nye risici skal tages i betragtning ved en risikovurdering. Broer 
og vindturbiner er to kategorier af infrastruktur, hvor nedbrud kan forårsage 
voldsomme skader, og de udgør dermed en stor risiko. Vi har derfor behov for 
rationelle beslutninger for at kunne vurdere disse risici. 
Dette ph.d.-projekt er en del af et større EU-finansieret projekt INFRASTAR under 
Marie Sklodowska-Curie programmet. Formålet med INFRASTAR (Innovative and 
Networking for Fatigue and Reliability Analysis of Structures Training for 
Assessment of Risk) er at udvikle viden, ekspertise og færdigheder for optimal og 
pålidelig styring af strukturer. I forlængelse af dette er det ph.d.-projektets formål at 
udvikle metoder for risikovurdering for vindturbiner og broer. I denne afhandling 
anvendes flere casestudier vedrørende en kompositbro samt studier af forskellige 
risikovurderingsscenarier: isbelægning samt vinger, der falder af i nærheden af 
motorvej, drivkraftsstadiet udnyttet i vind–brændselscelle hybrid energisystemer. 
Eksisterende metoder som i dag anvendes ved broer og vindturbiner, som for 
eksempel risikobaserede beslutningsprocesser, er viderebearbejdet og tilpasset, så det 
er muligt at anvende disse i beslutningsgrundlaget for drifts- og 
vedligeholdelsesaktiviteter i casestudiet af broen. Udover de risikobaserede drifts- og 
vedligeholdelsesteknologier, videreudvikles nuværende metodologier til modellering 
af konsekvenser af kritiske hændelser, baseret på eksisterende risikovurderings 
metodologier for vindturbiner, som fx. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION  
1.1. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
For both new and existing structures, it is vital to be able to make rational decisions 
on design, inspections, operation, maintenance, and repairs and to account for both 
uncertainties and consequences. The decisions can be related to both the design stage 
and throughout the service life of the structure; the decisions can be made using 
methods for risk analysis and assessment (Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2011; Havbro Faber, 
2007, 2008; Havbro Faber & Stewart, 2003; Havbro Faber, Straub, & A. Maes, 2006; 
Rastayesh, 2018; Rastayesh & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2017; Vrouwenvelder & Holicky, 
2001). 
The objective of this thesis is to develop and illustrate by case studies, methods for 
risk-based assessment for bridges and wind turbines, employing information from 
inspections, sensors, and condition monitoring, i.e. to apply measurement data to 
rational decision-making.  
To assess the risk, the adverse events are first modeled, the methods and tools for 
estimation of the probability of the adverse events identified, and then the 
consequences are modeled and combined with the probabilities.  
Additionally, the goal is to identify and develop illustrative tools for decision-making 
using the applied methodologies for risk assessment for each case study.  
For the case studies, the objective is to use existing methodologies for risk assessment 
of wind turbines and bridges; these methodologies are developed for specific 
applications. Another aim is to employ different methodologies and compare them to 
find the ones most suitable in each case study. Especially different methodologies 
such as FMEA, FTA, and BN are to be considered.  
1.2. OUTLINE AND KEY METHODS 
This project uses the framework described in the JCSS (Joint Committee for Structural 
Safety) guideline for risk assessment (JCSS, 2008) as the basis for advanced methods 
for risk-based decision-making and assessment for bridges and wind turbines, 
utilizing information from inspections, sensors, and condition monitoring, i.e., 
applying measurement data in rational decision-making (Rastayesh & Dalsgaard 
Sørensen, 2017).  
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The goals of the Ph.D. project are achieved using structural reliability theory, which 
includes statistical methods dealing with modeling of uncertainties related to loads, 
strengths, and modeling/calculation methods (Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2017).  
As mentioned previously, the approaches already available and used for bridges and 
wind turbines have modified and adapted, such as risk-based decision-making, in 
order to make it possible to use them as decision support tools for O&M activities for 
the case study of the bridge. In addition to risk-based O&M Approaches, available 
methods to model the impacts of adverse events are modified based on available risk 
analysis methods for wind turbines, such as FMEA, FTA, Decision Tree, and finally 
BN. These approaches are established in different case studies presented in the Ph.D. 
thesis. 
Chapter 2 presents a state of the art of the methodologies used for risk assessment in 
this thesis. Chapter 3 presents the case studies related to bridges, and Chapter 4 
presents the wind turbine applications. Finally, the conclusion and future works are 
discussed in Chapter 5 and 6.
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CHAPTER 2. RISK ASSESSMENT 
METHODOLOGIES 
2.1. RISK ASSESSMENT BACKGROUND 
In recent years, attention is more focused on sustainable economic growth being about 
saving nature and the well-being and safety of the individuals. Simultaneously, 
optimal allocations of existing resources should particularly be taken into account. 
The importance of risk and reliability engineering has been highlighted increasingly 
as a decision support tool. As an example of civil engineering, the different types of 
failure are load, mechanical, operational, installation, and structural failures. These 
failures could cause risk in different forms: environmental, fatality, and economical 
(Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2011; Velarde, Kramhøft, Sørensen, & Zorzi, 2020), see Figure 
2-1: Elements of decision making. The figure shows that different kinds of failure 
leading to different kinds of risk as the elements aiding the decision-making. These 
failures could be related to different life-cycles: design, manufacturing, 
commissioning, installation, operation, and decommissioning. Moreover, they could 
relate to different areas such as mechanical, electrical, structural, chemical, human, 
control systems, and cybersecurity issues. 
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Wind turbines and bridges are exposed to climatic conditions as well as environmental 
impacts, which decrease their life-cycle performance and further increase the risk of 
failure of these structures. For example, to guarantee acceptable risk levels of wind 
turbines during the entire lifetime, diverse O&M plans are used in the offshore wind 
industry contributing to 20-30% of the cost of energy (Jessen Nielsen & Dalsgaard 
Sørensen, 2011).  
When looking into the main difference between wind turbines and bridges, a wind 
turbine is a mixture between a building and a machine with a control system. This 
means that besides the structural point of view, electrical and mechanical components 
are required for their assessment. On the other hand, a bridge is more like a building, 
although some very large bridges can have some active control / demanding devices. 
Hence, in most of the bridges, a structural analysis is needed for the assessment. 
Moreover, wind turbines are mass-produced i.e. a large number of almost identical 
wind turbines. Further prototypes and zero-series wind turbines are typically made 
before mass production is started; although, bridges are typically a one-of-a-kind 
structure. 
A rational and comprehensive technique is needed to assess the risk exposure to the 
structures and to account for the consequences in order to prevent bridge failures, such 
as the  Genova bridge collapse in 2018 or the collapsed 35W bridge in Minneapolis 
in 2007 (Gash, 2007), or even wind turbine collapses (Miceli, 2013). 
Both bridges and wind turbines need to be maintained during their design lifetime to 
ensure a satisfactory reliability level. 
Bridges and wind turbines are generally designed to quite different reliability levels. 
Failure of a bridge can result in considerable economic consequences and loss of 
human lives whereas failure of a wind turbine typically does not expose people to risk 
and the economic consequences are low although there is a very high focus on 
minimizing the levelized cost of energy for wind turbines. 
Typical reliability levels for bridges and wind turbines are as follows (Dalsgaard 
Sørensen & Stensgaard Toft, 2014; DNV.GL, 2018; EN, 2019): 
• Bridges: the annual probability of failure of the order 10−7– 10−6 
• Wind turbines: the annual probability of failure of the order 10−4– 10 −3 
2.1.1. BASIC DEFINITIONS 
2.1.1.1 Risk 
Risk is introduced as a measure of the expected potential loss occurring because of 
natural or human activities (Modarres, 2006). Risk is described as the expected 
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consequences consort with a specified activity (Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2011; Havbro 
Faber, 2007, 2008; Havbro Faber & Stewart, 2003; Modarres, Kaminskiy, & Krivtsov, 
2016). Bearing in mind an activity with only one event with probability 𝑃𝑃 of this event 
occurring and with potential consequences 𝐶𝐶, then the risk 𝑅𝑅 is expressed as the 
product of the probability and the consequences (Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2011; Havbro 
Faber, 2007, 2008): 
𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃 ∙  𝐶𝐶 Eq. 1 




𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 Eq. 2 
where 𝑁𝑁 is the number of events and index 𝑖𝑖 designates event number 𝑖𝑖 (Dalsgaard 
Sørensen, 2011; Havbro Faber, 2007). 
2.1.1.2 Risk Analysis 
Risk analysis consists of three main constituents: risk assessment, risk management, 
and risk communication (National Academy Press, 1983; Spitzer, Schmocker, & 
Dang, 2004). Firstly, risk assessment, in this process, the probability or frequency of 
a loss by or to an engineering system is estimated, as well as the magnitude of the loss 
(consequence) is calculated or approximated (Modarres, 2006). Secondly, in the risk 
management procedure, the potential magnitude and contributors to risk are 
estimated, evaluated, minimized, and controlled (Modarres, 2006). Thirdly, in risk 
communication, the decision-makers and other stakeholders swapped, shared, and 
deliberated the information regarding the kind of risk (expected loss) and 
consequences, risk assessment method, and risk management decisions (Modarres, 
2006; Modarres et al., 2016; Vrouwenvelder & Holicky, 2001). 
Risk analysis is an estimation of the potential and magnitude of any loss and 
approaches to control it from or to a system (Modarres, 2006). Commonly, risk 
analyses are divided into three kinds: quantitative, qualitative, and their combination. 
Quantitative Risk Analysis 
Quantitative risk analysis calculates the risk in the form of the probability (or 
frequency) of a loss and evaluates such probabilities to make decisions and 
communicate the outcome (Modarres, Kaminskiy, & Krivtsov, 1999). When 
sufficient relevant data is available for risk analysis, this approach is preferable; 
although, collecting this kind of data is usually time-consuming, challenging, and 
expensive. This approach became recommended especially when costs are considered 
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as the consequence. (Vinnem, 2014) recommends in his book this approach rather 
than the other two for risk assessment of offshore structures such as wind turbines. 
Papers 1–6 in the annexes of this thesis used this methodology or (Bahrebar, 
Blaabjerg, Wang, Vafamand, et al., 2018; Bahrebar, Blaabjerg, Wang, Zhou, & 
Rastayesh, 2018; Bahrebar, Rastayesh, & Sepanloo, 2014; Bahrebar, Zhou, 
Rastayesh, Wang, & Blaabjerg, 2018; Mankar, Rastayesh, & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 
2019; Rastayesh & Bahrebar, 2014; Rastayesh, Bahrebar, Bahman, Dalsgaard 
Sørensen, & Blaabjerg, 2019; Rastayesh, Bahrebar, Blaabjerg, Zhou, & Wang, 2020; 
Rastayesh, Bahrebar, & Sepanloo, 2014; Rastayesh, Long, Dalsgaard Sørensen, & 
Thöns, 2019; Rastayesh, Mankar, Dalsgaard Sørensen, & Bahrebar, 2020).  
Qualitative Risk Analysis  
Due to the simplicity and quick way of utilizing the qualitative approach, it is more 
common for risk analysis. In this category, the potential loss is qualitatively estimated 
by linguistic scales. In this kind, a matrix is created which specifies the risk in the 
form of the frequency (or likelihood/probability) of the loss versus the potential 
magnitudes (amount) of the loss or impact in qualitative scales. Later, this matrix is 
utilized to make policy and risk management decisions (Modarres, 2006). Since data 
is not needed here from tests or other sources, it is easy to use; however, it is subjective 
and could influence the uncertainty of the risk analysis. 
A Mixture of Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis or Semi-quantitative 
Risk Analysis 
A mixture of both approaches mentioned earlier could be used for risk analysis in two 
different forms: the frequency or potential for loss is measured qualitatively, but the 
magnitude of the loss (consequence) is measured quantitatively or the other way 
around. Moreover, it is feasible that both the frequency and magnitude of the loss are 
calculated quantitatively; however, the policy setting and decision making part of the 
analysis depend on qualitative approaches (Modarres, 2006). 
2.1.1.3 Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is an organized and efficient process for recognition and 
quantification of events, frequencies, or probabilities and the magnitude of 
consequences or losses to recipients as a reason of exposure to hazards from failures 
(Modarres, 2006; Modarres et al., 2016). 
Risk assessment is a process to answer three basic questions (Kaplan & Garrick, 1981; 
Misra, 2008; Modarres et al., 1999): 
• What can happen or become wrong, that could lead to a hazard exposure 
outcome? 
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• How likely is it that it will fail, i.e. the probability of failure? 
• What consequences are expected if it happens? 
The procedure of decision-making based on risks is understood as risk assessment. 
Risk assessments should start from the initial stage of a system means from design, 
and it should continue until the last phase of service life (decommissioning). In the 
process of risk assessment, a clear explanation is needed for the assumptions 
considered for identifying the system as well as the consequences and frequencies. 
There are always uncertainties associated with risk assessment; using a sensitivity 
analysis, these uncertainties could be adjusted. Uncertainties associated with data or 
expert judgments should be identified. It is worthwhile to make sure that common 
uncertain factors for risk assessment should be identified (Havbro Faber, 2008; 
Havbro Faber & Stewart, 2003). 
The fundamentals of risk assessment start with identifying uncertainty and modeling 
of events in a probabilistic approach and finding the consequences and the acceptable 
risk. Meanwhile, risk reduction and/or risk mitigation and updating knowledge in all 
previous steps could be defined as the principal elements for risk assessment 
(Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2011). 
The key elements of risk assessment can be listed as identifying hazards and barriers, 
assessment of the likelihood of loss of barriers, estimation of the consequences of 
exposure to hazards, and finally, risk evaluation. 
Figure 2-2 shows a general and straightforward illustration for system risk assessment 
(Havbro Faber, 2008). 
 











e.g. loss of 
reputation 
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Utilizing the simplified process in Figure 2-2, the following shows the risk assessment 
of a wind turbine near a high way. In this example, the weather conditions are icy and 
snowy, and additionally the blade of the wind turbine may have a failure. The direct 
and indirect consequences are identified in the following tables.  
 
Figure 2-3: Exposure 
Table 2-1: Exposure 
Physical Features Indicator Potential Consequences 
Ice 
Wind loads 











                                                          
1 The reason for this is that the ice is not equally distributed on the blades. 
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Figure 2-4: Vulnerability 
Table 2-2: Vulnerability 






Corrosion on surface 
Increased vibrations 
Large deflection of 
blades 
Design target reliability 
Age 
Materials 
Quality of workmanship 
 
Blade failure 





Injuries and fatalities 
Damage to environment 
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Figure 2-5: Robustness 
Table 2-3: Robustness 
Physical Features Indicator Indirect Consequences 
Partial collapse 
Visible larger damages 
Increased stresses and 
vibration on the other 








Clean up costs 
Rescue costs 
Loss of functionality 
Injuries and fatalities 
Socio-economic losses 
Damage to environment 
Loss of reputation 
 
Figure 2-6 illustrates the decision theory, which provides a theoretical framework for 
risk assessment. 
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Figure 2-6: General scheme for risk-based decision analysis for risk assessment of ice or 
blades thrown off a wind turbine and hitting a car (Rastayesh, Long, et al., 2019). 
Blade throw 
Identification of parameters influencing the throw (e.g. mass, 
trajectories…)   






Analysis of probability Analysis of consequences 
Car properties 
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However, with bridges hazards can be categorized as bellow (Imhof, 2004; Nowak, 
2007; Nowak, Kozikowski, & Lutomirska, 2009): 
Natural Hazards 
• Earthquakes 
• Material degradation 
• Wind (hurricanes, tornadoes) 
• Floods (tsunami) 
• Snow and ice 
• Temperature effects 
Man-Made Hazards 
• Terrorist attacks, explosions, fires 
• Overloads (weight, height) 
• Inadequate maintenance (corrosion, cracking) 
• Acts on vandalism, intentional damage 
• Collisions –vehicles and vessels 
Various techniques for Hazard Identification (HAZID) are available such as Risk 
Screening (HAZID sessions), FMEA, Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Hazard 
and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Failure Mode Effect and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA), see e.g. (Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2011; Havbro Faber & Stewart, 2003; 
Stewart & Melchers, 1997) for a comprehensive review. In this thesis, methodologies 
such as fault tree, BN, decision tree, and FMEA will be discussed in the following 
sections.  
2.2. FAILURE MODES AND EFFECT ANALYSIS (FMEA) 
One of the most efficient methods which can be used for system recognition and 
identification for risk assessment is FMEA. FMEA is a methodology that focuses on 
prevention by facilitating process improvement as well as identifying and eliminating 
concerns early in the development of a process or design (Narayanagounder & 
Gurusami, 2009; Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2019). FMEA is a systematic and 
structured approach to identify, analyze, and rank estimated risk with various potential 
failure modes (Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2020). FMEA can assist engineers by 
preventing failures or reducing their effects by altering the design or control tests 
(Modarres, 2006; Modarres et al., 1999, 2016; Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2020). 
FMEA is an important risk tool to identify critical failure modes, causes, and 
mechanisms (Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2020). The aim is to reduce the risks before 
they happen. Therefore, with using FMEA,  diagnosing probable failure and 
dissatisfactions of functions for any component in a system would be feasible 
(Modarres, 2006; Modarres et al., 1999, 2016; Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2020).  
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The FMEA method has been used in different industries and it holds the three risk 
factors Occurrence (O), Detectability (D), and Severity (S). ‘O’ designates the rate of 
the risks, ‘D’ indicates the likelihood of predicting risks before they happen, and ‘S’ 
is the significance of the risk in the system (Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2020). The 
yield factor represented as the Risk Priority Number (RPN) is the multiplication of 
these three input parameters graded as the failure state (Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 
2020). There are different standards that have been used to classify different faults 
that occur in every system. Afterward, by multiplying these input factors, the highest 
RPN is recognized (Jensen et al., 2012; Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2019; Sutrisno, 
Gunawan, & Tangkuman, 2015). These results make it easier for specialists to identify 
failures and their causes, while analysts allocate an edge rate to classify failures 
(Collong & Kouta, 2015; Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2019; Whiteley, Dunnett, & 
Jackson, 2016). 
All failure causes and effects of the systems can be addressed by using FMEA; 
moreover, the RPNs will help classify the critical system. The aim is enhancement of 
reliability and reduction of risk to avoid the risk event happening (Adar, İnce, Karatop, 
& Bilgili, 2017). Figure 2-7 shows the process of the FMEA used in this thesis for the 
PEMFC system. 
 
Figure 2-1: FMEA Process (Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2019) 
2.2.1. FMEA OBJECTIVE 
Design improvement is the principal aim of FMEA. The objectives in System FMEA 
and Design FMEA are design improvement of the system), sub-system or component 
as well as improving test and verification plans. For Process FMEAs, the objective is 
the improvement of the manufacturing process design and the improvement of Process 
Control Plans (Carlson, n.d.; Pawar & Chikalthankar, 2017). 
1. Identification of  
PEMFC System
2. Diagnosis of 
Failure Modes, 
Causes, and Effect 
Analysis
3. Identification of 
Guidelines for 
Performing FMEA 
and Making the 
Scope Visible
4. Determination of 
the Basis Rules and 
Assumptions 
5. Calculation and 
Assessment of RPNs 
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FMEA identifies failure modes, causes, and their effects on the system, and 
subsequently, uses these identifications in the risk assessment for prioritization. In this 
way, the most necessary corrective actions could be found. 
2.2.2. FMEA PROCEDURE 
A logical sequence of steps using FMEA could be as follows (Bech Andersen, 2012; 
Jensen et al., 2012): 
 System definition. 
 Building system block diagram: structural (hardware)/ functional/ combined/ 
master logic diagram. 
 Identification of failure modes, effects, and causes. 
 Assigning severity for the causes by defining classification categories. 
 Find the occurrence rate of each failure mode. 
 Investigate if the failure is detectable, if yes it can be controlled. 
 Documentation and identification of the problem solutions in the design.  
For the presentation of the data of FMEA, Table 2-4 is used (Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et 
al., 2020).  










S O D RPN 
         
For estimation of Risk Priority Number (RPN), a successful approach is focusing on 
the severity, occurrence, and detection rankings within the context of a three–
dimensional risk matrix. 
For the goals mentioned above, FMEA is a powerful tool; however, when it comes to 
interactions between failure modes or, in other words, common cause failures, FMEA 
cannot meet this target. In this case, FTA could be the solution that is mentioned in 
the next sub-section. 
2.3. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA) 
System modeling in any system has a direct relation with the type of components, 
interactions, failure distributions, different assumptions, and various condition 
CHAPTER 2. RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES 
15 
characterizations. These are needed to have a perfect understanding of the system, 
which can be characterized to two main parts: Failure Modeling (using e.g. fault tree) 
and Event Modeling (by e.g. event tree) (Rastayesh & Bahrebar, 2014; Rastayesh et 
al., 2014).  
In the FTA methodology, the undesirable event is also known as the top event. 
Afterward, the procedure is to use a systematic and logical approach in order find the 
probable paths that could cause the top event. As a result, all component failures, or 
in other words their failure modes, are included in the fault tree, causing the top event 
to happen. Consequently, this methodology can be considered as a deductive 
approach. A fault tree can be introduced as a graphical tool that can represent the 
failure interactions leading to the top event (Modarres, 1993; Whiteley et al., 2016). 
It is hard to assume all fault events on the fault tree. Typically, important ones are 
selected although, the decision-making for this selection is not a random process. The 
selection of fault events is based on the fault tree construction process, design of the 
system and operation, operating history, existing failure data, and the expert’s 
judgments and their experience (Modarres et al., 1999; Placca & Kouta, 2011).  
Although the fault tree looks like an illustration of qualitative assessment, it can also 
be classified as a quantitative assessment. The most common quantitative approach is 
the cut sets using Boolean algebra. 
As a very simple example, Figure 2-8 is the fault tree of the Printed Circuit Board 
(PCB) failure where the top event is PCB fail. Top event fails if the connector or board 
fails. In Figure 2-8, events shown by a circle are basic events.  
 
Figure 2-1: Fault tree of PCB failure (Bahrebar, Zhou, et al., 2018) 
2.4. EVENT TREE METHOD 
The event tree method is suitable when successful operation of a system is dependent 
on an approximately chronological but separate operation of its sub-systems or units 
(Modarres, 1993). The event tree method may not be very important in simple 
systems; while it is a crucial factor in complex systems which require the sub-systems 
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to perform according to a planned sequence of events to reach a desirable outcome 
(Modarres et al., 2016). 
Event trees are constructed horizontally, where the initiating event is modeled from 
the left side (Modarres et al., 1999). The initiating event describes a condition when 
the operation of a system(s) occurs based on a valid demand. The development of the 
tree chronologically proceeds with the postulation of demand on each unit (or sub-
system). The top branch at each branch point represents event success, while the lower 
branch represents the failure of the event (Modarres, 2006). Figure 2-9 shows the 
concept of how to make an event tree. 
 
Figure 2-1: Illustration of the event tree concept 
2.5. DECISION TREE 
For risk assessment, another assisting tool that could help decision-makers is the 
decision tree. This methodology looks like a tree. Each scenario is modeled in a branch 
or route. The tree illustrates possible outcomes and costs, and it utilities that all 
outcomes and costs are the consequences of each scenario (“Decision Tree,” n.d.; 
Magee, 1964). Figure 2-10 illustrates the decision tree for risk analysis of the Value 
of Action (VoA) of wind turbines close to highways as an example of a decision tree. 
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Figure 2-1: Illustration of the decision tree for risk assessment of the VoA of wind turbines 
close to highways (Rastayesh, Long, et al., 2019). 
The aim of a decision-maker is to optimize the utility cost. There are two different 
forms of analysis: the so-called normal form and extensive form. In the end, the results 
of these two methods are the same, but each having some advantages for problem 
solving. In a few words, the extensive form works as a backward induction, while the 
normal form is the other way around (Raiffa & Schlaifer, 2013). The decision analysis 
approach in (Raiffa & Schlaifer, 2013) is also closely linked to Bayesian decision 
analysis including prior analysis, posterior analysis and pre posterior analysis (Havbro 
Faber, 2007, 2008). The assumptions and maximization of the utility for Figure 2-10 
are explained in paper (3) (Rastayesh, Long, et al., 2019).   
2.6. RISK-BASED APPROACHES 
2.6.1. RISK-BASED INSPECTIONS 
Risk-based inspection (RBI) plans have been advanced to optimize the cost of 
inspection planning as well as the design of the structures, for instance, concerning 
fatigue loads (Márquez-Domínguez, 2013). A chronological state of the art can be 
found in the following references: (Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2009; Havbro Faber, 
Dalsgaard Sørensen, Tychsen, & Straub, 2005; T Moan, 2005; Rangel-Ramírez & 
J.D., 2010; Sønderkær Nielsen, 2013; Thoft-Christensen & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 
1987). In (Straub & Havbro Faber, 2006), for cost benefit purposes, RBI is introduced 
as an appropriate strategy for inspecting, monitoring, as well as controlling the 
deterioration damage in offshore substructures. 
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Fundamentals of RBI are the Bayesian decision theory, see section 2.5 as well as 
structural reliability approaches. With the aim of RBI planning, it is necessary to do 
some computations. (Havbro Faber et al., 2005; Márquez-Domínguez, 2013; Straub 
& Havbro Faber, 2006) both suggest the computational process for offshore structures 
for RBI planning. 
With the purpose of finding the best maintenance plan, RBI can be used as a proper 
methodology for deteriorating structures using a tool for decision-making. In a 
nutshell, RBI is a method that uses any prior information such as data collected by 
inspection previously and tries to find the most cost-effective plan. For more 
information and understanding about RBI usage in e.g. steel structures (Márquez-
Domínguez, 2013; Rouhan, Goyet, & Havbro Faber, 2004) can be studied. In 
summary for risk and reliability updating, the key elements of information that can be 
obtained to help in this regard are the survival of structures, inspection data, and 
condition monitoring. As an example, the inspection outcome could be detection or 
no-detection of the cracks or of the crack length (Márquez-Domínguez & Dalsgaard 
Sørensen, 2012). In these situations, it is important to account for the uncertainty of 
the inspection, which can be done by Probability of Detection (PoD) curves (Márquez-
Domínguez, 2013).  
2.6.2. RISK-BASED O&M 
2.6.2.1 O&M planning 
Operators or owners of structures decide on O&M planning strategies during the 
lifetime of the structures (Chemweno, Pintelon, Nganga Muchiri, & Van Horenbeek, 
2018; Eduard Kostandyan, 2013). There are two different categories for O&M: 
preventive and corrective. The first one, preventive, means performing 
maintenance/repair before failure using information from inspections or condition 
monitoring. The second one, corrective, means no inspections/monitoring, but waiting 
until failure and then repairing or replacing the failed components. With the purpose 
of finding the optimum O&M, the goal is to minimize the cost and maximize the 
benefit during service life, considering downtimes as a significant factor. For 
example, in offshore structures, weather conditions during O&M greatly influence 
this decision-making as they have a direct impact on reliability (Eduard Kostandyan, 
2013). 
2.6.2.2 Risk-based O&M 
This thesis will implement the Bayesian decision theory, see section 2.5 as the 
theoretical basis for risk-based O&M planning of inspections and maintenance, which 
allows for updating of stochastic deterioration models of wind turbines support 
structures and bridges when new information becomes available from inspections and 
sensors/condition monitoring. Figure 2-11 shows this process. In the service life of a 
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structure, the aim is to maximize the total expected benefits minus costs. (Dalsgaard 
Sørensen, 2009) is explained the computational procedure. As a brief explanation, at 
the design stage, there are already some decisions planned, including the inspection 
and monitoring plans; however, these decisions will be updated based on the outcome 
of inspection/monitoring during the lifetime. As a result, new decisions can be made 
during service life. This process is ongoing until the end of the service life (Havbro 
Faber & Stewart, 2003). 
 
Figure 2-1: Decision tree for optimal O&M planning (Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2009; Sønderkær 
Nielsen, 2013) 
For this updating process, conditional probabilities can help with new available 
information collected for instance by inspection or monitoring (Havbro Faber, 2012). 
The Bayes rule, which is correspondingly the basis for the BN, is formulated in Eq. 3. 





𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵|𝐴𝐴)𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴)  Eq. 3 
where P(A) is the prior estimate, the marginal probability of B, is P(B), the likelihood 
of A given B is P(B|A) the posterior estimate (Sønderkær Nielsen & Dalsgaard 
Sørensen, 2010).  
Figure 2-10 was an example of Figure 2-11 in a case study solved in the paper (3) 
(Rastayesh, Long, et al., 2019). 
2.6.2.3 Bayesian Networks 
By means of nodes, a BN represents variables in a graphical manner using links 
between the variable to show their interdependencies. (Ashrafi, Davoudpour, & 
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Khodakarami, 2015, 2016) used BNs for reliability assessment of wind turbines. BN 
allows for the development of the damage over time. Fundamentals of BNs is 
discussed in (Fenton & Neil, 2013; Kjaerulff & Madsen, 2008). Moreover, 
(Sønderkær Nielsen & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2010) used BN as a tool for O&M 
planning for wind turbines using fracture mechanics approach and S-N curves to 
predict the damage size over time (Sønderkær Nielsen & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2010). 
(Luque & Straub, 2019; Rafiq, Chryssanthopoulos, & Sathananthan, 2014; Sønderkær 
Nielsen & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2017) used the dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) as 
a framework for risk-based planning. Figure 2-12 illustrates the BN for the Metal 
Oxide Semiconductor Field Transistor (MOSFET) as an example of a BN. 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Bayesian Network for the MOSFET (Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2020). 
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CHAPTER 3. BRIDGES 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates aspects of the objectives of the Ph.D. study through case 
studies presented in paper (1) and paper (2), applied to a bridge infrastructure.  
There are different approaches in literatures for risk assessment of bridges (Honfi, 
Leander, & Björnsson, 2017; Krogness Forsnes, 2015; Leander, Honfi, & Björnsson, 
2017; Liu, Xiao, Lu, & Deng, 2016; Zhou et al., 2015). Conventionally, fatigue 
problem is faced with two approaches: Wohler Curves or S-N curve and fracture 
mechanics (Ambühl, 2015). In this section, respectively, paper (1) uses the S-N 
approach, and paper (2) tries to establish compatibility between crack growth and S-
N Model in the Crêt De l’Anneau viaduct in Switzerland.  
3.1.1.  S-N APPROACH FOR RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
The S-N (Wöhler) curve, in combination with Miner’s rule, is the recommended 
approach for fatigue life calculations in all international codes and standards 
(Márquez-Domínguez, 2013). A broad state of the art review on fatigue life 
assessment for steel bridges is reviewed in (Ye, Su, & Han, 2014). A probabilistic S-
N fatigue model is used to determine the reliability level. 
3.1.2. FRACTURE MECHANICS APPROACH 
Fracture mechanics is used to model crack growth or, in other words, the damage 
evolution. Paris’s propagation law is a common approach to be used (Ayala-Uraga & 
Moan, 2007; Beržonskis & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2016; Leander et al., 2017; Lotsberg 
& Sigurdsson, 2005; Madsen, Krenk, & Lind, 2006; Torgeir Moan., Hovde, & 
Blanker, 1993; Shabakhty, Haselibozchaloee, & Correia, 2020). 
Reliability assessment based on the fracture mechanics approach is highly sensitive 
to estimated initial cracks (Leander et al., 2017; T Moan, 2005) as well as crack 
growth parameters and stress intensity factors (Kaminski & Rigo, 2018; Lotsberg, 
Sigurdsson, Fjeldstad, & Moan., 2016).   
3.1.3. RELIABILITY UPDATING BACKGROUND 
The reliability of the inspection method and procedure is of crucial importance for 
inspection planning. The more accurately the inspections are carried out, the more 
information can be revealed about the state of deterioration. However, more accuracy 
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implies more expensive methods, and it is essential to include this aspect into 
inspection planning. 
PoD curve is required for each of the relevant techniques modelling the reliability of 
the inspection technique (Márquez-Domínguez, 2013). For example, (Márquez-
Domínguez & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2012) used it for reliability updating. 
In a nutshell, reliability can be updated based on new information obtained from the 
inspection. This information is beneficial both for the current state of the structure and 
planning as well as for the future (Márquez-Domínguez, 2013). 
3.1.4. CALIBRATION OF FRACTURE MECHANICS MODELS TO 
S-N APPROACH  
From inspections and measurements, the obtained information is about the crack. 
While in the S-N curve based fatigue approach, there is nothing concerning cracks, it 
is just damage accumulation, which is obtained by the S-N approach. Thus, calibration 
is needed to relate cracks in the fracture mechanics approach and damage 
accumulation in the fatigue approach (Torgeir Moan. et al., 1993). Therefore, a 
calibration of the S-N fatigue approach to the fracture fatigue approach is often 
performed in order to derive the same level of reliability as S-N fatigue (Lotsberg et 
al., 2016; Mankar, Rastayesh, & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2018a). There is a high 
correlation between the resulting amount of required in-service inspection and this 
calibration (Mankar et al., 2019). 
3.1.5. BAYESIAN NETWORKS  
The crack propagation model obtained from the fracture mechanics model and the 
initial crack found from the calibration would be the input to a model using a BN, 
which is a methodology which can be used for decision-making for O&M planning 
(Rastayesh & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2019). There is more detailed discussion and 
detailed process in the following sections. 
3.1.6. UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS 
Each decision-making process requires an uncertainty analysis as there are always 
uncertainties to be accounted for in the recorded data and/or the model. The data can 
come from the outcome of inspections from different kinds of sensors (Urban, Strauss, 
Schütz, Bergmeister, & Dehlinger, 2014), inspections, and condition monitoring, or it 
could come from laboratory test results.  
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3.2. COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION ON REBAR DATA SET 
(PAPER 1) 
Uncertainty analysis is an important step in risk assessment (Mankar, Rastayesh, & 
Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2018b). For consideration of the uncertainty, there are different 
methodologies available. Taking into account the uncertainty in the probabilistic 
approaches is a key element. In this section, the aim is to investigate one of these 
methods suitable for the case study presented in paper (1). A comparative 
investigation is carried out in this paper on the available fatigue data set tested at 
Aalborg University by (Hansen & Heshe, 2001). Three different uncertainty 
approaches for this data set are used to investigate their impact in the reliability 
analysis of the Swiss bridge, Crêt De l’Anneau viaduct (Rastayesh, Mankar, & 
Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2018). Firstly, the Maximum Likelihood Method (MLM) is used 
to fit the statistical parameters in a regression model for the fatigue strength of rebars 
(Rastayesh, Mankar, et al., 2020). Moreover, the bootstrap methodology is analyzed 
for uncertainty analysis; however, it did not pass its test to be used for further 
investigation because of run-out data. Finally, the use of the Bayesian inference with 
the Markov Chain Monto Carlo approach is investigated (Rastayesh, Mankar, et al., 
2020). The usage of this approach showed that the reliability analysis could be more 
precise rather than using the MLM by Bayesian inference. For more details, please go 
through paper (1) in Annex 1. 
3.3. BAYESIAN NETWORK FOR RISK-BASED DECISION-
MAKING OF A COMPOSITE BRIDGE 
Nowadays, one of the challenges in the industries is to minimize the cost of O&M. 
Two related topics to find the best solution are: risk-based inspection and risk-based 
operation and maintenance. They could be considered to be a subset of risk-based 
decision-making. Offshore structures such as wind turbines are continuously exposed 
to loads that have a direct influence on the structure lifetime. This is the same situation 
with the loads on bridges, for example by vehicles. Thus, different strategies are 
applied to prolong their life cycle performance using risk-based inspection and risk-
based operation and maintenance. This section will investigate the use of BNs for risk-
based inspection and O&M planning. A framework utilizing BNs is suggested and a 
decision tool is proposed to manage structures subjected to deterioration in their 
lifetime. The aim is to find the optimum decisions based on the cost of maintenance 
and inspection. The procedure could prevent failures in the structures and reduce 
consequences caused by late inspections or maintenance as well as early ones to 
optimize the cost of repair and inspection. 
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3.3.1. DAMAGE EVOLUTION MODEL FOR THE FATIGUE OF 
REBARS USING CALIBRATION OF THE S-N MODEL TO THE 
FM MODEL (PAPER 2) 
This section uses the results from the previous section (Paper 1). The aim is to find 
the crack propagation model as an indicator of decision-making, which can be used 
in the BN. By using a fracture mechanics (FM) approach, the model for crack 
propagation is developed in Paper (2) by back calculating from the S-N approach 
presented in Paper (1). For more details, see Paper (2). 
3.3.2. BAYESIAN NETWORK MODEL FOR O&M PLANNING  
(Rastayesh, Sønderkær Nielsen, & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2018) provides an 
introduction of how BNs could be used as a tool for O&M planning. In this regard, 
the dynamic influence diagram is proposed as a framework that focuses on risk-based 
decision-making (Rastayesh, 2019). The damage development model over time is 
used as the basis for the proposed methodology. The indicator for the risk-based 
decision-making is the damage size. The initial value is set to “a(0)”, meaning crack 
size at time 0. In this approach, the damage states are considered by intervals as it is 
not possible to consider continuous distributions while using influence diagrams. 
Hence, the distribution known from the damage model is discretized.  
3.3.3. DISCRETIZATION METHODOLOGY 
In case of a normal distribution, it is assumed that 10 intervals is enough to catch the 
whole distribution from three times sigma from the mean value. In other words, the 
distribution is truncated from both sides. For other distributions, the power function 
methodology for discretization is used (Friis-Hansen, 2000). (Straub, 2009) also 
suggested a discretization methodology for continuous distributions. 
Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 shows the discretized distributions using Hugin software. 
 
Figure 3-1:Discretization of the exponential distribution for cracks 
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Figure 3-2: Discretization of the normal distribution for model uncertainty 
In the damage model, there is always uncertainty associated, which can change over 
time or could be considered constant for all time steps. For instance, considering load 
parameter, the load is changing over time. Consequently, if it is modeled by a 
distribution such as lognormal, the mean and standard deviation could change over 
time (Sønderkær Nielsen & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2017).  Although in many studies, 
they are all considered the same over time (Friis-Hansen, 2000). Node, Model 
Uncertainty, “MU” is taken into account for all resistance and load parameters 
uncertainty labeled “A”, as an example in time step 2, it is shown as A(02).   
In this time step, a utility node is added called Cost of Failure, “CF(0)”. Failure would 
happen if the design of the structure fails and causes the collapse or local failure in 
the infrastructure. 
In the next time step, T(02), an assumed two-year interval, an inspection decision will 
be made in the decision node, Inspection Decision, “Inspect(02)”, with two states, 
inspection or no inspection. In this case study, it is assumed that the inspector starts 
the first inspection and interval based on the designers' plan described in the design 
stage. There is always a cost involved with each inspection in the utility node, Cost of 
Inspection, ”CI(02)”.  
This inspection is assumed to distinguish the damage at four states: finding failure, 
finding crack, finding nothing, and no inspection. This information is stored in the 
chance node called Inspection Result, “InspRes(02)”. As seen in Figure 3-4, this node 
is dependent on the Inspection Decision and “a(02)”. “a(02)” is calculated the same 
way as “a(0)” with a damage degradation model over time. Moreover, this node 
includes a PoD giving the probability of detection of a crack given the crack size. 
The uncertainty associated with each inspection is modeled by the probability of the 
detection curve with an exponential distribution function (Georgiou, 2006). This 
model is needed to model the fact that there is always more probability to detect larger 
damages. 
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The repair strategy is taken into consideration through three states in the node called 
“a rep(02)”, which is the crack after repair which is assumed to be the same as the 
initial crack. This node will decide to exchange when the inspection outcome is a 
failure, meaning the damage state will come back to initial damage if the exchange is 
done. 
The repair node has a cost with a utility node assigned for it named Cost of Repair 
“CR(02)”. 
Some assumptions are considered for simplicity. The focus of this section is to show 
the dynamic influence diagram approach, which can easily be developed to any other 
case.  
It is assumed that at the initial time step, there is no failure means the “PF(0)” 
probability of failure is zero for all intervals except the last one; as seen in Figure 3-3. 
“dPF(02)” is the difference of probability of failures with the previous time step (Friis-
Hansen, 2000). 
 
Figure 3-3: Probability of failure at the initial time step 
As a conclusion, which is mainly taken from the approach presented in (Friis-Hansen, 
2000), a comprehensive DBN using influence diagram is proposed for the risk-based 
decision-making, where at each time step the damage will be updated after repair. The 
dynamic BN is built in the Hugin software. The temporal nodes are suggested instead 
of showing each time step to be calculated for 10 time steps, which allows to easily 
add more time steps in the calculation to cover more years. The temporal nodes in 
Figure 3-4 are “T_A(02)”, “T_a(02)” and ”T_a rep(02)”. 
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Figure 3-4: Dynamic Influence Diagram as a Framework for Risk-Based Decision-Making 
Figure 3-5 is the extension of Figure 3-4 to three time steps. 
 
Figure 3-5: The extended form of Figure 3-4 (Friis-Hansen, 2000) 
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CHAPTER 4. WIND TURBINES 
1.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the objectives of the Ph.D. are investigated through case studies for 
wind turbines, published in Papers 3–6.  
There are different approaches in the literature for risk assessment of wind turbines 
(Asghari, Pourgol Mohammad, & Salehpour Oskouyi, 2015; Hallowell et al., 2018; 
Hammar, Wikström, & Molander, 2014; Hong & Möller, 2012; Integrated 
Environmental Data, 2013; Kang, Sun, Sun, & Wu, 2017; Mensah & Dueñas-Osorio, 
2012; Rastayesh, Zorzi, Miraglia, & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2019; Shafiee & 
Dinmohammadi, 2014; P. Tavner, 2012; P. J. Tavner, Xiang, & Spinato, 2007). 
For risk assessment of an adverse event, as mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, the 
preliminary step can be identifying what caused this risk to happen and then to 
investigate the effects of the risk. For quantitative risk assessment, a failure 
probability model could be obtained from the parameters causing this risk event to 
happen and, subsequently, the consequence modeling to calculate the adverse event 
risk. The consequences can be put in different main categories, environmental, 
fatality, and economic impacts. These categories could be categorized in wind 
turbines as follows: operating expenses (OPEX), capital expenditures (CAPEX), 
development expenditure (DEVEX), revenue, people, environment, reputation, delay 
in the project, and, most importantly, production loss during different life-cycles of 
the wind turbine. For instance, people as one of the categories could be in different 
forms: injury or fatality. Moreover, the level of the injuries could also be classified as 
minor and major. Different classifications for each of the consequences mentioned 
above would help to reach a better result in the risk analysis during the identification. 
In order to have an accurate risk assessment, the decision-maker must pay close 
attention to the classification and identification of the risk likelihood and its impact.   
There are different methodologies available for risk assessment. Risk analysts should 
find the best method aimed for the objective of decision-making. In the following, 
FMEA, FTA, BN and decision tree are investigated for wind turbine case studies as 
the best practice. However, there is not a unique solution for finding the best method 
for each decision-making process, as each of them has pros and cons. 
4.1. RISK ASSESSMENT OF WIND TURBINES NEAR HIGHWAYS 
(PAPER 3) 
There is always a risk if any failure in the wind turbine leads to throwing one or more 
than one part or object of the wind turbine off to its surrounding (Braam & 
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Rademakers, 2004; Gupta, Robinson, Sanderson, & Morrison, 2012; Kaposvari & 
Weidl, 2015; Rastayesh & Dalsgaard Sørensen, 2018; Sarlak & Nørkær Sørensen, 
2016; Seifert, Westerhellweg, & Kröning, 2003). The same scenario in icy conditions 
(a cold climate) could happen if ice can throw off wind turbines, specifically from the 
blades (LeBlanc, 2007). Considering a case where these surroundings are located, the 
risk could have different consequences. There are some countries where there is 
limited space for placing wind turbines. In this situation, it could be considered to 
locate wind turbines in areas which there are in the vicinity of a highway (Rastayesh, 
Long, et al., 2019). As mentioned earlier, based on the location of the wind turbine, 
the impacts of a risk event (failure of a blade or ice throw) could be different. For 
instance, if the wind turbines are placed near some houses, the risk could be damage 
to buildings and people. Other conditions could be if the wind turbines are placed near 
a highway, and the consequence could be on the cars passing by on the highway, 
which also means the driver and passengers. These examples could be classified into 
the impact on the environment, people, and production loss in the consequence 
categories, as mentioned in section 4.1.  
In this chapter, the case study is considered where there is a risk to people in cars 
when wind turbines are placed near a highway. Figure 4-1 depicted this scenario 
where the wind turbines are placed near a highway. 
 
Figure 4-1: Wind turbines near a highway 
Risk models in three different cases are developed, and a risk model for each scenario 
is developed (Dalsgaard Sørensen, Nørkær Sørensen, & Lemming, 2012; Rastayesh, 
Long, et al., 2019). These three failure scenarios are as follow:  
Scenario 1: When failure of the blades could lead to throwing off part of the wind 
turbine blade or the entire blade. In Figure 4-2, the model illustrates the same scenario 
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when a part of the blade is thrown off the wind turbine and hits a car. Using a function 
of distance from the wind turbines to the highway, the risk is calculated (Rastayesh, 
Long, et al., 2019). 
 
 Figure 4-2: Blade thrown off the wind turbine near a highway 
In cold climates, ice accretion on the blades could result in throwing ice pieces to the 
surroundings. In Figure 4-3, the model demonstrates the situation when an ice piece 
is thrown off a wind turbine and hits a car. Risk is calculated as a function of distance 
from the wind turbines to the highway (Rastayesh, Long, et al., 2019). 
 
Figure 4-3: Ice from the wind turbine near a highway 
There are two different cases in this situation: 
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Scenario 2: the wind turbines could still be operating, and ice pieces can be thrown 
off.  
Scenario 3: the wind turbine could be in an idling mode, which means a detection 
system identified the ice condition, and the wind turbine is stopped (Rastayesh, Long, 
et al., 2019). Although it should be noted since still wind is blowing, it could lead to 
throwing off ice pieces. Please see the video attached as complementary material to 
this chapter of the thesis.  
An anti-icing or de-icing system in scenarios 2 and 3 could be a solution to avoid or 
decrease the risk of these events. In this case, it is required to have an ice detection 
system to give an indication to the de-icing or anti-icing system to start functioning. 
The aim of this paper is to use the decision tree as a decision tool for risk-based 
decision-making to find out whether it is worth installing a heating system on blades 
to avoid the risk of ice being thrown off the wind turbines placed near a highway and 
hitting a passing car (Rastayesh, Long, et al., 2019). The application of Bayesian 
decision analysis is discussed in this paper. Considering some assumptions described 
in detail in Paper (3), the following simplified decision tree is developed. Assuming 
an ideal ice detection system, Figure 4-4 is the result of the decision tree suggested. 
The VoA is utilized in this decision-making. 
 
Figure 4-4 simplified decision tree for decision-making whether to use ice heating system 
(Rastayesh, Long, et al., 2019) 
To answer the question if it is worth turning on the heating system or not, Figure 4-4 
shows a decision tree for this decision-making process considering two decisions that 
should be optimized. The first utility 𝑢𝑢ℎ0which points out to the decision of whether 
to shut down the wind turbine, and second one the decision to turn on the heating 
system 𝑢𝑢ℎ1. Eq. 4 is the calculated VoA (Rastayesh, Long, et al., 2019). 
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𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴 = 𝑢𝑢ℎ1 − 𝑢𝑢ℎ0 Eq. 4 
In order to solve Eq. 4, using the suggested decision tree, the Bayesian decision theory 
is applied to maximize the cost of benefits. Each parameter of Eq. 4 is expanded to 
another detailed equation considering the probability of failure of each scenario 
presented in Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3  and their consequences in the form of impact 
to people or production loss or cost of the heating system during the wind turbine 
lifetime. The results indicate that such systems should be used in countries that have 
a relatively high frequency of icy weather. Moreover, the duration of downtime as an 
essential factor in the results shows that the decision to use the heating system is 
highly related to this factor. 
4.2.  RISK ASSESSMENT OF POWER STAGE USED IN WIND-
FUEL CELL HYBRID ENERGY SYSTEMS 
As mentioned in the introduction, there is not a unique methodology that can be used 
for the risk assessment of each system to give the best results, as each of these methods 
has its advantages and disadvantages. The aim in this section, which refers to Papers 
(4, 5, and 6), is to explore methodologies described in the introduction, including 
FMEA, FTA, and BN, with a case study that has application in wind turbines. In these 
three papers, proton exchange membrane fuel cells (PEMFCs) are chosen as a 
renewable energy source that can be used as a hybrid energy system together with 
wind turbines. By a system engineering approach and using FMEA, it is possible to 
identify critical components, failure modes, and failure causes (Bahrebar, Blaabjerg, 
Wang, Rastayesh, & Zhou, 2018; Bahrebar, Blaabjerg, Wang, Zhou, et al., 2018). The 
Risk Priority Numbers (RPN) are obtained by means of the FMEA. Moreover, by BN, 
critical causes of critical components have been explored using the RPNs obtained 
from FMEA. In addition, the reliability analysis is done applying FTA, by considering 
exponential and Weibull distributions for failure rates. The importance of obtaining 
more realistic reliability is highly dependent on the failure data. To see also the 
influence of the O&M, the FTA is applied for reliability assessment. Repair action 
shows a great impact on the availability of the system. 
4.2.1. LIFETIME ESTIMATION AND FAILURE RISK ANALYSIS IN 
A POWER STAGE USED IN WIND-FUEL CELL HYBRID 
ENERGY SYSTEMS (PAPER 4) 
This paper presented a failure mechanism analysis of the power stage components as 
a central part of the power conditioner sub-system in a hybrid wind-fuel cell system 
using the FMEA and the FTA methods (Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2019). In this 
article, the power stage FMEA process and its utilization in ranking the estimated risk 
priority with various potential failure modes for critical subcomponents is explained. 
The failure mechanism of power stage components for selected critical 
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subcomponents is identified and analyzed by the FMEA. Figure 4-5 shows important 
subcomponents of the power stage in the power conditioner utilized in PEMFC. 
 
Figure 4-1: Critical power stage subcomponents in a power conditioner utilized in PEMFC 
(Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2019). 
The failure mechanism analysis of the MOSFET as a critical active component is 
identified with details. Some failure mechanisms have significant effects on system 
reliability and made some critical failure modes. FMEA identifies some of the failure 
modes of active subcomponents such as MOSFET and passive subcomponents like 
electrolyte capacitors. Considering the FMEA results, three main failure parts of the 
power stage (input filter, power amplifier, and output filter) are considered in the FTA. 
Utilizing FTA of the power stage, it is identified how failure could happen.  
Figure 4-6 is the fault tree of the power stage of PEMFC where the top event is power 
stage failure. Top event fails if the input filter or power amplifier or output filter fails.  
 
Figure 4-2: Fault tree of the power stage of PEMFC (Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2019) 
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The reliability curve of the power stage is estimated for a five years period, consistent 
with the product guarantee period. The B1 lifetime of the power stage using 
exponential distribution is concluded to be near two folds smaller than the Weibull 
distribution. Besides, the Weibull lifetime estimation by applying the Monte Carlo 
simulation shows closer results to the real experience. Hence, the more realistic 
reliability analysis results by the Weibull distribution make it a superior distribution 
compared to exponential distribution. Although the Weibull parameters are usually 
not available for all components or can prove to be challenging to obtain by reliability 
tests, the FMEA is still recommended as the method of choice for distinguishing high-
risk components and their Weibull parameters for reliability analysis. 
4.2.2. A SYSTEM ENGINEERING APPROACH USING FMEA AND 
BAYESIAN NETWORK FOR RISK ANALYSIS—A CASE STUDY 
(PAPER 5) 
This study proposed a system engineering approach using a comprehensive FMEA 
analysis by applying the block diagram, function block diagram, and parameter 
diagram (Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 2020). These methodologies are implemented to 
provide a better understanding of the power conditioner system for the risk analysis 
in a PEMFC system.  
First, using the FMEA for the PEMFC system, potential failure modes of the 
components and critical components have been identified. Furthermore, potential risk 
numbers are assigned to each failure mode. The results have presented risky 
components based on high RPNs. The highest RPNs correspond to the failure modes 
in three components with a wide range of failure modes, including high Leakage 
Current (LC) of the MOSFET, Short Circuit (SC) of the capacitor, and increased LC 
due to gate oxide of the MOSFET. In other words, short circuits, open circuits, and 
leakage current are found as the most important failure modes. Besides, the 
MOSFETs, capacitors, chokes, and transformers are identified as the critical 
components of the power stage. These components should be considered in the design 
stage. Lastly, the most critical failure causes among the more important items are 
identified by the FMEA method and used for BN analysis. The BN is implemented 
by two states of true and false (failure and success) (García & Gilabert, 2011) to find 
the most critical failure causes such as high temperature and overvoltage, which have 
been ascertained utilizing BN. The BN investigates the impact of each failure cause 
in order to identify the most effective one among other failure causes in the most 
critical component (MOSFET) at the system. Table 4-1 shows the FMEA of the 
MOSFET and Figure 4-7, the BN of the MOSFET. In Figure 4-7, the high temperature 
importance is feasible. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4. WIND TURBINES 
35 




Figure 4-3 High temperature effect failure on the MOSFET (Rastayesh, Bahrebar, et al., 
2020). 
Finally, some solutions are proposed to reduce the risk of damage to the entire system 
due to failure modes and causes. Knowing the failure modes will help designers to 
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pay more attention to terms of use, material properties, and design of various 
components to avoid failures caused by high temperature and overvoltage. 
4.2.3. RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF POWER CONDITIONER 
CONSIDERING MAINTENANCE IN A PEM FUEL CELL SYSTEM 
(PAPER 6) 
In this paper, the reliability and availability issues of the power conditioner system in 
the PEMFC is investigated by using the FTA (Bahrebar, Zhou, et al., 2018). The 
methodology – as a conventional approach for reliability assessment – is designed to 
illustrate the relations between basic events, logical variables, and significant 
components. The FTA approach is applied as a graphic representation of the different 
combinations of failures causing the occurrence of a top event (Modarres et al., 2016). 
FTA is used as a deductive process to analyze five sub-systems in the power 
conditioner as our top events. Figure 4-8 shows the simplified configuration of the 
power conditioner. 
 
Figure 4-4 The simplified configuration of the power conditioner (Bahrebar, Zhou, et al., 
2018). 
Aging is one of the major aspects that could affect the system reliability. One of the 
critical steps in the reliability calculations is choosing an appropriate distribution that 
helps to show the aging effect. By applying the Monte Carlo simulation and 
considering maintenance and inspection policies, the availability is calculated for the 
system during operation. Besides, the reliability curves are compared for five main 
components of the power conditioner in this case, proving the availability of the 
system increases under planned maintenance. For decision-makers, one solution to 
optimize the maintenance is to look at the inspection or monitoring systems by 
considering the inspection intervals. However, the repair actions for critical 
components could significantly affect the availability of the system. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
There is a variety of risk assessment approaches. One of the primary steps is to identify 
which methodology is the most suitable one in a risk assessment project. The solution 
is not the same for each industry because of its aim. For wind turbines and bridges, it 
is the same issue. There is not even a unique answer for the best approach that can be 
used in the risk assessment. Despite the fact, each method has some pros and cons. 
One of the main goals of this Ph.D. was to identify and develop illustrative computer 
tools for decision-making using the applied methodologies for risk assessment for 
case studies. In order to reach this goal, two different infrastructures – bridge and wind 
turbines (These two types of structures were given by the INFRSASTAR project) – 
have been investigated to reach a better approach for risk assessment of each case 
study described in chapters 3 and 4.  Each case study incorporates an investigation of 
the evaluation of hazards and the recommendation of a plan in order to reach a lower 
level of risk.  
Firstly, for a data set from the fatigue test, different uncertainty methodologies, MLM, 
Bootstrapping, and Bayesian, are compared. The results from the Bayesian approach 
had better performance than the others. The results have been used for reliability 
analysis of a case study of a Swiss bridge as discussed in Chapter 3. The importance 
of uncertainty analysis and its effect on the reliability analysis has been investigated. 
Later, using the fracture mechanics approach and inputs from inspections, O&M data 
including repairs from sensors and condition monitoring, a BN is suggested using 
dynamic influence diagrams. This case study uses BN, which is based in the Bayesian 
decision theory, as the illustrative tool to fulfill the goal of the Ph.D., which enables 
the risk assessment modeling dynamically during the lifetime. In the worst case 
scenario, cracks could lead to local failure and collapse of the structure as the adverse 
event in this case. 
In the risk assessment of ice and blades thrown off wind turbines near a highway, 
three cases as adverse events are studied, and finally, using the As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP) principle, the risk is found acceptable. Moreover, using decision 
trees as the illustrative tool, the application of the heating system as a solution for an 
icy condition to avoid ice thrown off the wind turbine is investigated. Based on the 
results in this study, it is better to consider the installation of such systems when the 
frequency of icing in that area is considerable, although the lack of enough data in this 
study was challenging. Similarly, Bayesian decision theory as the basis for the 
decision tree is utilized as the tool for the risk assessment of this case study. The 
condition monitoring information from sensors (heating system, anemometer…) is 
used to reach the goal of the Ph.D. in this case study. 
In addition, the application of PEMFCs and wind turbines as a hybrid system is 
investigated. Usage of FMEA is a standard methodology, especially during the design 
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phase of a project, although it is more qualitative or semi-quantitative. Besides, FTA 
and BNs are more powerful tools when it comes to quantitative analysis, although 
both qualitative and quantitative inputs can be feed into BNs. Once more, the Bayesian 
decision theory is used as the illustrative tool in the BN supported FMEA and FTA to 
reach the goal in this case study. Moreover, the influence of repairs in the decision 
making is investigated by FTA for decision-making.  
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CHAPTER 6. FUTURE WORK 
The basic methodologies for risk assessment presented is considered applicable for 
the case studies considered, especially the application of the Bayesian approach. 
However, further development is needed to model and assess systems modelling e.g. 
a wind turbine with many different components or wind farms with many wind 
turbines, especially development of the computational capabilities are needed.  
A major challenge of most risk assessment projects is the lack of diverse data, 
especially failures, as these are very often confidential in the industries, and even in 
some situations no data are recorded. Hence, it is recommended to track and record 
data of failures for the systems considered. Even though the qualitative approaches 
could be a solution in this regard, the uncertainty is still higher than the quantitative 
approaches. Moreover, qualitative approaches usually use expert opinions, which 
itself has uncertainty. It is recommended that if no quantitative data is available to 
collect, more experts are needed to be involved for qualitative judgment following 
standards available in this regard in some industries. 
Sensors and measurements required for the risk assessments need to be assessed 
during the design stage. For example, the selection of which kind of sensors can be 
used as indicators for cracks during the lifetime of a bridge or a wind turbine, and so 
it may be necessary to install the sensors during the fabrication and execution of the 
structure. Moreover, the uncertainty of these sensors has an essential impact on the 
risk assessment that needs to be considered. 
There are several methodologies that are not discussed in this project and that 
industries are using for risk assessment, and the best solution for each could be 
developed if more data would be available.   
The model used for crack propagation in the BN can be further developed. A suitable 
sensor as an indicator for crack sizes and consideration of their installation during the 
building phase of the structure could be recommended in order to have a better basis 
for the decision-making. The assumption here is if cracks can be detected or not. If 
the information about the size of the crack was available, the analysis could be more 
reliable. This case could be challenging for concrete structures. 
All these aspects could be an advancement to have better risk assessment with less 
uncertainty. 
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Abstract: This paper presents recent contributions to the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative 
Training Network titled INFRASTAR (Innovation and Networking for Fatigue and Reliability 
Analysis of Structures-Training for Assessment of Risk) in the field of reliability approaches for 
decision-making for wind turbines and bridges . Stochastic modeling of uncertainties for fatigue 
strength parameters is an important step as a basis for reliability analyses. In this paper, the 
Maximum Likelihood Method (MLM) is used for fitting the statistical parameters in a regression 
model for the fatigue strength of reinforcement bars. Furthermore, application of the Bootstrapping 
method is investigated. The results indicate that the latter methodology does not work well in the 
considered case study because of run-out tests within the test data. Moreover, the use of the 
Bayesian inference with the Markov Chain Monto Carlo approach is studied. These results indicate 
that a reduction in the statistical uncertainty can be obtained, and thus, better parameter estimates 
are obtained. The results are used for stochastic modelling in reliability assessment of a case study 
with a composite bridge. The reduction in statistical uncertainty shows high impact on the fatigue 
reliability in a case study on the Swiss viaduct Crêt De l’Anneau. 
Keywords: Bayesian inference; bootstrap method; Maximum Likelihood Method; reinforced-
concrete; uncertainty; fatigue-resistance 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper presents statistical analyses performed on fatigue data obtained from [1], where 
laboratory fatigue tests were performed on reinforcement bars (rebars). 
General methods and techniques utilized for risk and reliability assessment of civil engineering 
structures are presented [2–18]. 
Statistical analyses of the data are an essential step for the stochastic modeling of the material 
fatigue uncertainties, which can next be used as a basis for a probabilistic modeling and reliability 
analysis [19] of structures with reinforced concrete components, such as wind turbines and bridges 
[20,21]. Usually, foundations for onshore wind turbines are constructed by the use of reinforced 
concrete, which is also used in many bridges. Therefore, the development of stochastic models for 
the fatigue limit state and estimation of the resulting reliability can be considered as a contribution 
to reliability assessment of these types of structures, with respect to fatigue failure and also as the 
basis for the development of optimal strategies for the maintenance of wind turbines and bridges. 
[22]. 
Several methodologies can be used to estimate the statistical parameters. For instance: Maximum 
Likelihood Method (MLM), moment method, least square method, and Bayesian statistics. In the 
literature, there are some recommendations indicating which of these methods could be more 
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suitable. At the same time, there is no unique answer to this question, especially for a fatigue case 
study on rebars. On the reliability assessment, choosing a specific method has a direct influence. In 
the reliability assessment, there is a need to have stochastic modeling for the material-resistance as 
well as for the loads. In this paper, the material-resistance model is presented in detail, and at the 
end, using a generic stochastic model for the fatigue load reliability results of a composite bridge are 
presented.  
The MLM is chosen in this study as it gives an estimate of the statistical uncertainties [23]. MLM 
is considered for fitting the statistical parameters [2] in a regression model for fatigue strength. 
Typically, the statistical analyses are based on a limited number of data, for which MLM can provide 
estimates of the uncertainties associated with each of these parameters and the correlation between 
the parameters [24]. This paper also presents the use of the Bootstrap method, which generates 
synthetic data based on the available measurements from the experiment.  
Further, Bayesian statistics is considered taking subjective/prior information into account. This 
is done with application of Bayesian inference with a Markov Chain Monte Carlo implementation 
[25–27]. Bayesian updating is an appropriate tool to update the structural performance function for 
fatigue by applying the information from the structural health monitoring and the prior information 
about different fatigue parameters. The aim is to compare the results of different methodologies and 
to provide information in order to select an appropriate method. 
To study the effect of uncertainty of fatigue resistance model on the fatigue reliability of a 
structure, a case study of Swiss viaduct Crêt De l’Anneau is presented. For this structure, long term 
strain monitoring data on critical reinforcement is available. 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Test Data 
Test data on the fatigue strength test for steel reinforcement from the lab tests were done at 
Aalborg University by Hansen and Heshe [1]. It is utilized for the statistical analysis to determine 
typical fatigue strength uncertainties (see Table 1, where 1 indicated run-out/no failure and 0 
indicates failure). The lab tests are performed with steel reinforcement bars with 16 mm of diameter 
and yields strengths of 570 MPa. The S-N curve for this data is presented in Figure 1. Run-outs are 
depicted in orange and failures in gray. 
Table 1. Data [1]. 
Data Number (Index) Number of Cycles to Failure Stress Range [MPa] Run-out 
1 7,875,829 337 1 
2 4,485,923 335 1 
3 9,182,542 391 1 
4 3,981,071 385 1 
5 347,328 396 0 
6 589,346 403 0 
7 441,005 405 0 
8 371,852 408 0 
9 341,454 408 0 
10 238,658 405 0 
11 255,509 408 0 
12 255,509 420 0 
13 273,550 430 0 
14 215,443 430 0 
15 411,921 439 0 
16 398,107 419 0 
17 411,921 424 0 
18 255,509 467 0 
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19 184,784 488 0 
20 161,215 488 0 
21 161,215 494 0 
22 131,376 503 0 
23 114,619 505 0 
24 129,154 506 0 
25 158,489 507 0 
26 140652 536 0 
27 105,250 536 0 
28 80,113 561 0 
29 53,201 572 0 
30 48,026 572 0 
31 50,547 572 0 
 
Figure 1. S-N curve for rebar data [1]. 
2.2. Statistical Analysis of Fatigue Data of Steel Reinforcing Bars 
For steel reinforcement bars used in concrete S-N, curves are recommended by various 
international codes (such as Model code 2010, Model code 1990, DNV OS C 502, EN 1992-1) [28–31] 
and are generally written as: 𝑛 = 𝐾 ∆𝑠 , (1)
or log 𝑛 = log 𝐾 −𝑚 log(∆𝑠 ), (2)
where 𝑛  is the number of cycles to failure with stress range  ∆𝑠  in test number, 𝑖. 𝐾  and 𝑚 are 
fatigue parameters to be fitted by MLM here using test data [31]. 
To account for uncertainties in fatigue life, Equation (2) can be rewritten [22]: log(𝑛 ) = log(𝐾) −𝑚 log(∆𝑠 ) + 𝜀, (3)
where 𝜀 represents the uncertainty of the fatigue life model and is modelled by a stochastic variable 
with mean value equal to zero and standard deviation, 𝜎 . 𝜀 is often assumed to have a Normal 
distributed [31]. 
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The Likelihood function to be used to estimate the optimal values of the parameters 𝐾, 𝑚, and 𝜎  from test data is written [22]: 𝐿(𝐾,𝑚,𝜎 ) =  ∏ 𝑃 log(𝐾) −𝑚 log(∆𝑠 ) + 𝜀 = log(𝑛 ) ×∏ 𝑃[log(𝐾) −𝑚 log(∆𝑠 ) + 𝜀 > log (𝑛 )]. (4)
Here, 𝑛  is the number of stress cycles to failure or to run-out with stress range ∆𝑠  in test 
number i. 𝑛  is the number of tests where failure occurs, and 𝑛  is the number of tests where failure 
did not occur after 𝑛  stress cycles (run-outs). The total number of tests is 𝑛 = 𝑛 + 𝑛 . 𝐾, 𝑚, and 𝜎  are obtained from the optimization problem 𝑚𝑎𝑥 , , 𝐿(𝐾,𝑚,𝜎 ), which can be solved using a 
non-linear optimization algorithm [31]. 
Run-outs contain information which from a statistical point of view has to be included in the 
statistical modelling in order to be consistent with all tests performed. This paper describes how run-
outs can be included using the MLM. The number of cycles where the tests are stopped are often 
chosen in order to limit the costs and time used for the test campaign. 
The terms in Equation (4) can be obtained from Equation (5) [22]: 𝑃[log(𝐾) − mlog(∆𝑠 ) + 𝜀 = log(𝑛 )] = √ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 − ( ) (∆ ) ( ) , 𝑃[log(𝐾) − mlog(∆𝑠 ) + 𝜀 > log(𝑛 )] = 𝛷 log(𝐾) − mlog(∆𝑠 ) − log(𝑛 )𝜎 . (5)
The parameters 𝐾,  𝑚,  and 𝜎  are generally determined using a limited number of data. 
Consequently, the estimates are subject to statistical/parameter uncertainty. Since the parameters are 
estimated by the MLM, they become asymptotically (number of data should be >25–30). Normal 
distributed stochastic variables with expected values equal to the maximum-likelihood estimator and 
a covariance matrix equal to [32]: 
𝐶 , , = −𝐻 , , = 𝜎 𝜌 , 𝜎 𝜎 𝜌 , 𝜎 𝜎𝜌 , 𝜎 𝜎 𝜎 𝜌 , 𝜎 𝜎𝜌 , 𝜎 𝜎 𝜌 , 𝜎 𝜎 𝜎 . (6) 𝐻 , ,  is the Hessian matrix with second-order derivatives of the log-likelihood function. 𝜎 , 𝜎 , and 𝜎   denote the standard deviations of 𝐾, 𝑚, and 𝜎 , respectively, and e.g., 𝜌 ,  is the 
correlation coefficient between 𝐾 and 𝑚. 
2.3. Bootstrap Method 
The Bootstrap method developed by Efron [33] may be used for smaller samples and is quite 
flexible concerning the assumptions made. The Bootstrap method applies the actual distribution of 
the measurement errors, which are then propagated using an appropriate Monte Carlo scheme. That 
is, the Bootstrap method can be used to estimate the statistical (parameter) uncertainty. 
Fatigue tests take very long time as it can take millions of cycles before the failure of one 
specimen, and changing the frequency of load application could lead to erroneous results. The 
Bootstrap method can be used to generate more synthetic data, which can then be used to estimate 
the parameter uncertainties as an alternative to the use of MLM described above. 
Residuals are estimated by subtracting the calculated number of cycles to failure from the 
observed number of cycles in logarithmic scale. These residuals are plotted in Figure 2a, considering 
the case when run-outs are not included. This histogram indicates that an assumption of residuals as 
white noise is satisfactory and it is uniformly distributed with a mean value equal to zero. In this 
case, the Bootstrap method can be used, but in applications where run-outs are part of the data, the 
Bootstrap method cannot be used directly, as seen in Figure 2b. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 2. Histogram for Residuals: (a) without Run-outs; (b) with Run-outs. 
If we plot the residuals along with their index (data number), they are random without 
considering run-outs, which is a basic requirement for using the Bootstrap method, as seen in Figure 
3a. Random in this context means that residuals should not follow a pattern [34]. Whereas in Figure 
3b with run-outs, residuals are following a pattern, so this requirement to apply the Bootstrap method 
is not fulfilled here. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 3. Residuals Pattern: (a) without Run-outs; (b) with Run-outs. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that Bootstrapping can be used for estimating parameter 
uncertainty only in the case of no run-outs. 
2.4. Bayesian Inference with Markov Chain Monte Carlo Implementation 
Bays’ rule provides the mathematical basis to update beliefs (prior information) about a variable, 𝜃, given observations, 𝑦. By Bays’ rule, the posterior probability of 𝜃 given observations, 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦) is 
obtained as follows [35,36]: 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦) = ( ) 𝑦 𝜃( ) , (7)
Future predictions for 𝑦 ∗ given observations 𝑦 is obtained from the predictive distribution 𝑝(𝑦∗|𝑦) = 𝑝(𝑦∗|𝜃)𝑝(𝜃|𝑦)𝑑𝜃, (8)
Thus, future predictions are modeled using the updated probability density function 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦) 
similar to making a prediction for 𝑦 ∗  using a single value of 𝜃  in the classical statistical sense. 
Equation (8) can be estimated using Monte Carlo simulation strategies such as the Markov-Chain 
Monte-Carlo algorithm [36]. 
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By definition, a Markov chain simulation is a sequence of random variables 𝜃 ,𝜃 ,𝜃 , …  for 
which for any 𝑘, the distribution of 𝜃  depends only on the most recent one 𝜃 . In practice, 
several independent sequences of Markov chain simulations are created. The Metropolis algorithm 
is used to obtain the transition distribution function [31]. It is an adaption of a random walk that uses 
an acceptance/rejection rule to converge to the specified target distribution. The step-by-step 
procedure is as follows [27]: 
1. Select initial parameter vector 
2. Iterate as follows for 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, …   
a. Create a new trial position 𝜃∗ = 𝜃 + ∆𝜃,  where ∆𝜃  is randomly sampled from the 
jumping distribution 𝑞(∆𝜃). 
b. Create the Metropolis ratio. 
𝑟 = 𝜃∗ 𝑦𝜃 𝑦 , (9)
3. Accept a new sample if: 𝜃 = 𝜃∗         with probability  min(𝑟, 1)𝜃                                      otherwise, (10)
Note that this requires the jumping distribution to be symmetric: 𝑞 (𝜃∗, 𝜃 ) = 𝑞 (𝜃 ,𝜃∗). If 
the jumping distribution is not symmetric, then the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm [37] can be used 
where both sides jumping distributions are part of the ratio. 
Since the posterior distribution can be calculated by Equation (7), where 𝑝(𝑦) is a normalizing 
constant, it also follows that the posterior density function can be written as: 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦) ∝ 𝑝(𝜃)𝑝(𝑦|𝜃), (11)
i.e., the posterior distribution is proportional to the product of the prior and the likelihood functions.  
If it is assumed that the prior distribution is the multivariate Normal distribution, then the 
Likelihood function becomes: 𝑝(𝑦|𝜃,𝜎 ) = √ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 − 𝑆𝑆(𝜃) , (12)
where, 𝑆𝑆(𝜃) = ∑ 𝑦 − 𝑓(𝑆, 𝜃) , (13)
The Metropolis ratio becomes: 𝑟 = 𝜃∗ 𝑦,𝜎𝜃 𝑦,𝜎 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 − 𝑆𝑆(𝜃∗) − 𝑆𝑆(𝜃 ) , (14)
The scale reduction factor R indicates a potential scale reduction for the considered distribution 
when the number of samples goes to infinity (see [38] for theory and more detailed descriptions). The 
sampling is said to converge if R is close to one. Therefore, the number of simulations should be 
chosen such that R becomes as close to one as possible, and thereby, the Monte Carlo sampling error 
close to zero. 
The parameters fitted in the SN-curve in Equation (1) are 𝐾 and 𝑚. The correlation between 
them is illustrated in Figure 4. Here, the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm is used. Furthermore, 
the Metropolis algorithm is applied for obtaining the transition distribution. Based on Reference [36], 
the scale reduction factor 𝑅 is also calculated to 1.0007. 
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Figure 4. Correlation between 𝑘 and 𝑚  
3. Results of Uncertainty Modelling. 
Table 2 shows a comparison between the results obtained by the methods presented above. This 
includes results obtained for the statistical parameters by MLM accounting for run-outs. 
Furthermore, a characteristic, 5% quantile is estimated using the MLM estimates resulting in log 𝑘 = 18.77, which is larger than the characteristic value equal to 17.054 specified in the Eurocodes (see 
[38,39], and Table 2). 

















 𝜀  0 0 --- --- Normal Error term  𝜎   0.39 0.21 0.06 0.04 Normal Standard deviation of 
error term 
 log 𝑘  18.77 18.72 0.07 0.05 Normal Location parameter in 
Wöhler 
curve  𝑚  Fixed 












The Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation results in Figure 5a show that log 𝑘 is mostly in the 
interval 18–19, and in Figure 5b, 𝑚 is close to 5, which is in agreement with the fixed value used for 
MLM. It should be noted that 𝑚 is assumed fixed in the reliability section. The Posterior marginal 
density function is also shown in Figure 6. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 5. Markov Chain Simulation for: (a) 𝑘; (b) 𝑚. 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 6. Posterior marginal density functions: (a) 𝑘; (b) 𝑚 . 
4. Case Study: Crêt De l’Anneau Viaduct 
To illustrate the effect of change of model uncertainty of  log 𝑘, i.e., 𝜎  on the fatigue reliability 
of a structure, a case study of a composite (reinforced concrete deck and steel box girders) viaduct in 
Switzerland is chosen as seen in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. A view of Crêt De l’Anneau. 
The identified fatigue critical location of this composite bridge is the reinforced concrete slab, as 
shown in [40] pp.41. The fatigue behavior of the reinforced concrete deck slab is mainly governed by 
transverse bending between two girders. It contributes also to local longitudinal bending under 
vehicle rolling wheel loads, thus it is double bending behavior. The MCS department at EPFL has 
installed electrical strain gauges on reinforcement bars at critical location. This monitored strain data 
is used as action effects to perform fatigue reliability analysis of the viaduct, a reliability framework 
presented in [41] is used for the purpose. 
4.1. Limit State Equation 
A limit state equation for fatigue failure of critical reinforcement in the viaduct is formulated 
based on the Palmgren-Miner rule [42,43] assuming linear damage accumulation, Equation (15), and 
[41,44]. 𝑔(𝑡) = Δ − ∑ ∙ (𝑋 𝑅 ∆𝑠 ) = 0, (15)
where 𝑡 indicates time 0 𝑡 𝑇  in years, 𝑇  is the service life time of the structure, 𝑅  is modelling the ratio of design parameters, here the section modulus of the deck slab, Δ𝑠  is the stress range for the 𝑖th load bin. 
All other terms in the limit state equation are explained in Table 3. 
Table 3. Stochastic model for Wöhler curve. 
Parameter Distribution Mean  Standard Deviation Remark  𝛥  Lognormal 1 0.30 Model uncertainty related to PM Rule 1  𝑋   Lognormal 1 0.05 Uncertainty in strain measurements  𝑋   Lognormal 1 0.01 Uncertainty in number of vehicles  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑘  Normal 18.77 0.07 Location parameter in Wöhler curve  𝑚  Fixed 5 --- Slope of Wöhler curve fixed to 5 2  𝜖  Normal 0  𝜎   Error term taken from Table 2  𝜎   Normal 0.39/0.21 3 0.06/0.004 3 Standard deviation of error term taken 
from Table 2  𝜌 ,   Deterministic 0.06/0.003 3 --- Correlation coefficient between location and standard deviation of error taken from 
Table 2 
1 model uncertainty obtained by fitting lognormal distribution to test data in [45]; 2 slope of Wöhler 
curve fixed to 5 as log 𝑘 and m are highly correlated with correlation coefficient equal to 0.9997; 3 two 
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values are used for analysis first one from MLM approach, while the second one is from Bayesian 
approach. 
4.2. Reliability Analysis 
The First Order Reliability Method (FORM) is used for reliability analysis [2,46]. An open-source 
MATLAB-based toolbox, namely the FERUM (Finite Element Reliability Using MATLAB), is used for 
performing all FORM calculations [47]. The cumulative (accumulated) probability of failure in time 
interval [0, t] is obtained by Equation (16): 𝑃 (𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑔(𝑡) ≤ 0), (16)
The probability of failure is estimated by FORM [47]. The corresponding reliability index 𝛽(𝑡) 
is obtained by Equation (17): 𝛽(𝑡) = −𝜙 𝑃 (𝑡) , (17)
where, 𝜙() is standardized normal distribution function.  
The annual probability of failure is obtained by: 𝛥𝑃 (𝑡) = 𝑃 (𝑡) − 𝑃 (𝑡 − 𝛥𝑡), 𝑡 > 1𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟, (18)
where Δ𝑡 = one year. The corresponding annual reliability index is denoted  𝛥𝛽. 
4.3. Reliability Results 
The cumulative reliability index along the service life of the structure is presented in Figure 8 for 
the case where uncertainty in vehicle number 𝑋  is 1% and CoV for log𝐾 is as 0.39 (MLM) and 0.2 
(Bayesian). 
 
Figure 8. Reliability index as function of time. 
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Table 4. Annual reliability index as function of CoV of log𝑘. 
CoV of 𝐥𝐨𝐠𝒌  Annual Reliability Index at 120 Years 
0.39 (MLM) 3.90 
0.20 (Bayesian) 4.25 
The actual stress in slab of viaduct is very low, thus exhibiting a very high fatigue reliability. 
Current results are shown for the case of scaled stresses. Even after the scaling of the stresses annual 
reliability index is within acceptable levels, which is more than 3.7 (for the case of very high 
consequence and low efficiency of intervention, [48]). Furthermore, it can be seen from the results 
that CoV for 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐾 has a very high influence on reliability index. Thus, estimating the CoV with great 
accuracy is very important in order to estimate the safety of the structures reasonably. 
5. Conclusions  
In this paper, for stochastic modeling of uncertainties for fatigue strength parameter, MLM as a 
common methodology is utilized to fit the statistical parameters in a regression model based on 
available test data. The Bootstrapping method is used to generate synthetic data. Example 
investigations in this paper indicate that Bootstrapping cannot be used if run-out data are to be 
accounted for. Thus, further steps are not proceeded to estimate statistical parameters. It should be 
mentioned that if the Bootstrapping method was fulfilled the requirement (random pattern), another 
methodology such as least square method or even Bootstrapping could be used for parameter 
estimation in the next step. Subsequently, the use of Bayesian inference with the Markov Chain 
Monto Carlo approach is studied. 
Reliability analysis of a selected detail in the Cret De l’Anneau Viaduct is used to illustrate and 
compare different stochastic models obtained by the statistical methods. The results obtained by 
MLM is used in reliability analyses and is assumed as a prior for Bayesian. The results show 
difference in the reliability indices, indicating the importance of accurate estimation of the model 
uncertainty of the SN-curve. The results emphasize the choice of statistical method as it influences 
the reliability analyses. In this case study, Bayesian provided better statistical uncertainty, hence 
better fatigue reliability assessment.  
Authors Contributions: The main idea for the paper was proposed by S.R. S.R. wrote the first draft of the paper, 
except Section 4 which was drafted by A.M. S.R., A.M. and S.B. provided literature review. S.R. developed the 
methodology wrote relevant codes for Maximum likelihood method, Markov Chain Monte Carlo, Bayesian 
inference and Bootstrap and reviewed by A.M. A.M. developed the reliability framework with relevant codes 
with input for stochastic model from S.R. S.R. and A.M. post-processed the results. J.D.S. supervised the findings 
of this work and reviewed methodology. S.R., A.M., J.D.S. and S.B. contributed for articulate the research work 
in its current form as full research manuscript. All authors discussed the results and contributed to the final 
results. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript. 
Funding: Current work is carried out under the project INFRASTAR (infrastar.eu), which has received funding 
from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie 
grant agreement No. 676139. The grant is gratefully acknowledged. 
Acknowledgments: These current codes were further developed based on codes provided in DTU Summer 
School on Uncertainty and sensitivity analysis of numerical models—7–11 August 2017, lecturer: Gurkan Sin, to 
suit current application. 
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest. 
References 
1. Hansen, L.P.; Heshe, G. Static, Fire and Fatigue Tests of Ultra High-Strength Fibre Reinforced Concrete and 
Ribbed Bars. J. Nord. Concr. Res. 2001, 26, 17–37. 
2. Sørensen, J. Notes in Structural Reliability Theory and Risk Analysis; Aalborg University: Aalborg, Denmark, 
2011. 
-14-
Appl. Sci. 2020, 10, 604 12 of 13 
3. Madsen, H.O.; Krenk, S.; Lind, N.C. Methods of Structural Safety; Prentice-Hall: Upper Saddle River, NJ, 
USA, 1986. 
4. Ditlevsen, O.; Madsen, H. Structural Reliability Methods; Wiley: Hoboken, NJ, USA, 1996. 
5. Faber, M.H. Risk Assessment in Engineering (Principles, System Representation & Risk Criteria). 
https://www.jcss.byg.dtu.dk/-
/media/Subsites/jcss/english/publications/risk_assessment_in_engineering/jcss_riskassessment.ashx?la=da&has
h=F4BD53E6E9C2AD6242FD54762719D55BD251A995 (accessed on 15 November 2019). 
6. Kaplan, S.; Garrick, B.J. On the Quantitative Definition of Risk. Risk Anal. 1981, 1, 11–27. 
7. Modarres, M. Risk Analysis in Engineering: Techniques, Tools, and Trends; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, USA, 
2006. 
8. Zio, E.; Baraldi, P.; Cadini, F. Basics of Reliability and Risk Analysis: Worked Out Problems and Solutions, World 
Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd: Singapore, 2011. 
9. Zio, E. Introduction To The Basics Of Reliability And Risk Analysis [Elektronisk resurs], World Scientific 
Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd: Singapore, 2007. 
10. Chemweno, P.; Pintelon, L.; Muchiri, P.N.; Van Horenbeek, A. Risk assessment methodologies in 
maintenance decision making: A review of dependability modelling approaches. Reliab. Eng. Syst. Saf. 2018, 
173, 64–77. 
11. Aven, T.; Zio, E. Knowledge in Risk Assessment and Management; John Wiley & Sons: Hoboken, NJ, USA, 2018. 
12. Pham, H. Bayesian Inference for Probabilistic Risk Assessment; Springer: Berlin, Germany, 2005. 
13. Fenton, N.; Neil, M. Risk Assessment and Decision Anlysis with Bayesian Networks; CRC Press: Boca Raton, FL, 
USA, 2013. 
14. Singpurwla, N.D. Reliability and Risk. A Bayesian Perspective; John Wiley & Sons, Ltd: Chichester, UK, 2006. 
15. Aven, T. Risk assessment and risk management: Review of recent advances on their foundation. Eur. J. 
Oper. Res. 2016, 253, 1–13. 
16. Lair, J.; Rissanen, T.; Sarja, A. Methods for Optimisation and Decision Making in Lifetime Management of 
Structures. 2004, Available online: https://www.scribd.com/document/342349363/METHODS-FOR-
OPTIMISATION-AND-DECISION-MAKING-IN-LIFETIME-MANAGEMENT-OF-STRUCTURES 
(accessed on 15 November 2019). 
17. Vrouwenvelder, A.; Holicky, B.M.; Tanner, C.P.; Lovegrove, D.R.; Canisius, E.G. Risk Assessment and Risk 
Communication in Civil Engineering. 2001. Available online: 
https://www.irbnet.de/daten/iconda/CIB14314.pdf (accessed on 15 November 2019). 
18. Bhattacharya, B. Risk and Reliability in Bridges. Innovative Bridge Design Handbook; Elsevier: Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands, 2016. 
19. Bahrebar, S.; Zhou, D.; Rastayesh, S.; Wang, H.; Blaabjerg, F. Microelectron. Reliab. J. 2018, 88–90, 1177–1182. 
20. Rastayesh, S.; Bahrebar, S.; Bahman, A.S.; Dalsgaard Sørensen, J.; Blaabjerg, F. Lifetime Estimation and 
Failure Risk Analysis in a Power Stage Used in Wind-Fuel Cell Hybrid Energy Systems. Electronics 2019, 8, 
1412. 
21. Rastayesh, S.; Long, L.; Dalsgaard Sørensen, J.; Thöns, S. Risk Assessment and Value of Action Analysis for 
Icing Conditions of Wind Turbines Close to Highways. Energies 2019, 12, 2653. 
22. Màrquez-Dominguez, S. Reliability-Based Design and Planning of Inspection and Monitoring of OffshoreWind 
Turbines; Aalborg University: Aalborg, Denmark, 2013. 
23. Mankar, A.; Rastayesh, S.; Dalsgaard Sørensen, J. Sensitivity and Identifiability Study for Uncertainty 
Analysis of Material Model for Concrete Fatigue. In Proceedings of the 5th International Reliability and 
Safety Engineering Conference, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran, 9–10 May 2018. 
24. Seber, G.; Wild, C. Non-Linear Regression; Wiley: Hoboken, NJ, USA, 1989. 
25. Rastayesh, S.; Bahrebar, S.; Blaabjerg, F.; Zhou, D.; Wang, H.; Dalsgaard Sørensen, J. A System Engineering 
Approach Using FMEA and Bayesian Network for Risk Analysis—A Case Study. Sustainability 2020, 12, 
77. 
26. Rastayesh, S.; Sønderkær Nielsen, J.; Dalsgaard Sørensen, J. Bayesian Network Methods for Risk-Based 
Decision Making for Wind Turbines. In Proceedings of the EAWE PhD Seminar on Wind Energy, Brussel, 
Belgium, 18–20 September 2018. 
27. Metropolis, N.; Ulam, S. The Monte Carlo method. J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 1949, 44, 335–341. 
28. MC1990, FIB Model Code for Concrete Structures 1990; Ernst & Sohn: Berlin, Germany, 1993. 
29. MC2010, FIB Model Code for Concrete Structures 2010; Ernst & Sohn: Berlin, Germany, 2013. 
-15-
Appl. Sci. 2020, 10, 604 13 of 13 
30. Høvik, S. DNV OS C 502, DNV OS C 502, Offshore Concrete Structures; DNVGL: Høvik, Norway, 2012. 
31. Rastayesh, S.; Mankar, A.; Sørensen, J.D. Comparative investigation of uncertainty analysis with different 
methodologies on fatigue data of rebars. In Proceedings of the 5th International Reliability and Safety 
Engineering Conference, Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran, 9–10 May 2018. 
32. Lindley, D. Introduction to Probability and Statistics from a Bayesian Viewpoint, vol. 1+2; Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, UK, 1976. 
33. Efron, B. Bootstrap Methods: Another Look at the Jackknife. Ann. Stat. 1979, 7, 1–26. 
34. Sin, G.; Gernaey, K.V. Data Handling and Parameter Estimation. In Experimental Methods in Wastewater 
Treatment; IWA publishing: London, UK, 2016; Volume 281780404745. 
35. Alfredo, H.; Tang, W.H. Probability Concepts in Engineering: Emphasis on Applications in Civil & Environmental 
Engineering, 2nd ed.; Wiley: Hoboken, NJ, USA, 2007. 
36. Gelman, A.; Carlin, J.B.; Stern, H.S.; Dunson, D.B.; Vehtari, A.; Rubin, D. Bayesian Data Analysis; A 
Champman & Hall Book: New York, NY, USA, 2003. 
37. E. 1990, Eurocode 0: Basis for Structural Design; Cen: Brussels, Belgium, 2002. 
38. Hastings, W.K. Monte Carlo sampling methods using Markov chains and their applications. Biometrika 
1970, 57, 97–109. 
39. E. 1992-1-1, Eurocode 2: Design of Concrete Structures - Part 1-1: General Rules and Rules for Buildings; Cen: 
Brussels, Belgium, 2004. 
40. MCS. Surveillance du Viaduc du Crêt de l’Anneau par un Monitoring à Longue Durée; MSC: Lausanne, 
Switzerland, 2017. 
41. Mankar, A.; Rastayesh, S.; Dalsgaard Sørensen, J. Fatigue reliability analysis of Crêt de l’Anneau viaduct: 
A case study. Struct. Infrastruct. Eng. 2019, doi:10.1080/15732479.2019.1633361. 
42. Palmgren, A. Die lebensdauer von kugellagern (The life of ball bearings). Zeitschrift Des Vereins Deutscher 
Ingenieure 1924, 68, 339–341. 
43. Miner, M.A. Cumulative damage in fatigue. Am. Soc. Mech. Eng. J. Appl. Mech. 1945, 12, 159–164. 
44. Mankar, A.; Rastayesh, S.; Dalsgaard Sørensen, J. Fatigue Reliability analysis of Cret De l’Anneau Viaduct: 
A case study. In Proceedings of the IALCCE 2018, Ghent, Belgium, 18–31 October 2018. 
45. CEB 1988. Fatigue of Concrete Structures - State of Art Report; CEB: Zurich, Switzerland, 1989. 
46. Madsen, H.O.; Krenk, S.; Lind, N.C. Methods of Structural Safety; Dover Publications: New York, NY, USA, 
2006. 
47. FERUM. Finite Element Reliability Using Matlab; University of California Berkeley: Berkeley, CA, USA, 2010. 
48. SIA-269, Existing Structures–Bases for Examination and Interventions; Swiss Society of Engineers and 
Architects: Zurich, Switzerland, 2016. 
 
© 2020 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access 
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 
 
-16-
APPENDIX A. JOURNAL PAPERS 
 
Paper 2:  
 
Title:  




Amol Mankar, Sima Rastayesh, John Dalsgaard Sørensen 
 
Published in:  
Structure and Infrastructure Engineering 2019; doi:10.1080/15732479.2019.1633361 
  
-17-
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=nsie20
Structure and Infrastructure Engineering
Maintenance, Management, Life-Cycle Design and Performance
ISSN: 1573-2479 (Print) 1744-8980 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/nsie20
Fatigue reliability analysis of crêt de l’Anneau
viaduct: a case study
Amol Mankar, Sima Rastayesh & John Dalsgaard Sørensen
To cite this article: Amol Mankar, Sima Rastayesh & John Dalsgaard Sørensen (2019):
Fatigue reliability analysis of crêt de l’Anneau viaduct: a case study, Structure and Infrastructure
Engineering, DOI: 10.1080/15732479.2019.1633361
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/15732479.2019.1633361
Published online: 12 Jul 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 161
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
-18-
Fatigue reliability analysis of crêt de l’Anneau viaduct: a case study
Amol Mankar , Sima Rastayesh , and John Dalsgaard Sørensen
Department of Civil Engineering, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark
ABSTRACT
Fatigue of reinforced concrete is often not considered for civil engineering structures since the self-
weights of reinforced concrete structures are very high (in case of normal strength concrete) while live
loads are relatively small, which leads to very small stress variations during service duration of the
structure. However, particularly for bridge structures with increased use of high strength concrete and
increase in traffic loads, this scenario is reversed and fatigue verification becomes much more import-
ant for the safety. This paper presents a probabilistic approach for reliability assessment of existing
bridges along with reliability-based calibration of fatigue-design-factors based on the S-N approach,
calibration of S-N approach with fracture-mechanics approach and reliability updating using inspec-
tions along with a case study for the Crêt de l’Anneau viaduct in Switzerland. It has been observed
that, a designer needs to design the structure for fatigue life of 3.5–4.5 times the planned service life,
in order to achieve the target annual reliability index of 3.7 at the end of the service life. Further, the
presented framework can easily be extended to any other viaducts to estimate the fatigue reliability
and maintain the safety level throughout the entire service duration.
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Until 1960, it was believed to be impossible to get any
fatigue failure in reinforced concrete structures with mild
steel as reinforcement within the level of permitted stresses
at that time, (Mallet, 1991). Most of the bridges in
Switzerland built during the last 50 years are reinforced con-
crete bridges and they typically experience more than 100
million cycles of fatigue load during design lifetime. This is
especially the case for reinforced concrete decks of such
bridges exposed to traffic loads during their lifetime, which
are not designed for fatigue (Schl€afli & Br€uhwiler, 1998,
p. 1).
Currently bridge engineers in the industry use Palmgren
& Miner’s rule of linear damage accumulation along with
W€ohler curves from codes and standards (e.g. SIA-261,
2003) for new structures and (SIA-269, 2016) for existing
structures. The result might often be the replacement of the
existing bridge or atleast its deck. On strength side, the
fatigue tests exhibit large scatter, and on action side, codes
defining heavy vehicles as actions/loads may lead to non-
economical and non-ecological solutions.
A better way forward could be the use of reliability meth-
ods (probabilistic approach) to assess the bridge, by quanti-
fying all possible uncertainties in loads and resistance and
thereby form a better basis for decision-making. This
requires to formulate a stochastic material model from the
fatigue test data and a stochastic load model using among
others, the monitoring of strains in the structure at critical
locations. By this approach, it is possible to quantify the
level of damage and the remaining useful fatigue life of the
structure. Further, in order to maintain the reliability above
acceptable level throughout the service life, it can be import-
ant to perform inspections and use the outcomes of the
inspections to update the reliability and proceed with miti-
gation actions, if necessary.
Fatigue reliability assessment of the steel components of
bridges is studied in many references where Weight In
Motion data (WIM) are used to estimate the reliability of
orthotropic bridge decks (see e.g. Yang, Xinhui, Naiwei, &
Yang, 2016). Kihyon and Dan (2010) focussed on fatigue
reliability assessment of steel bridges by using probability
density functions of the equivalent stress range based on the
field monitoring data. Saberi, Rahai, Sanayei, and Vogel
(2016) estimated the bridge fatigue service life using oper-
ational strain measurements. Furthermore, probabilistic reli-
ability assessment of steel structures exposed to fatigue is
studied by Krejsa (2014). Sain and Chandra Kishen (2008)
presented a probabilistic approach for assessment of fatigue
crack growth in Steel Reinforced Concrete (SRC). Petryna,
Pfanner, Stangenberg, and Kratzig (2002) proposed a time
variant reliability framework, at component level along with
a material model for reinforced concrete; however, the
obtained results show its inapplicability to system level.
Based on the literature review, it can be seen that, most
of the research work for fatigue of bridges is limited to steel
bridges or its components, very few researchers focus on
concrete bridges. Further, most of the researchers limit to
determinstic approaches, when using monitoring results. To
estimate fatigue reliability of a reinforced concrete bridge by
taking care of all possible uncertainties in load and fatigue
CONTACT Amol Mankar ama@civil.aau.dk
 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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strength, in a probabilistic way, this paper presents a reli-
ability-based framework for assessment with respect to
fatigue failure of Crêt de l’Anneau viaduct as a case study.
where the Labourator of Maintenance, Construction and
Safety of the structures (MCS) department at Ecole poly-
technique federale de Lausanne (EPFL), Lausanne,
Switzerland has installed a long-term monitoring system for
estimating strains in the structure deck slab. As part of reli-
ability-based framework, stochastic modelling of fatigue
strength of reinforcing bars along with stochastic modelling
of fatigue loads is presented as well as the calibration of
fatigue safety factors. The reliability indices obtained are
compared with target values indicated in SIA-269 (2016),
the Swiss standard for existing structures.
Further, a probabilistic fracture-mechanics (FM)
approach (damage evolution model) for the tensile
reinforcement is developed based on Ayala-Uraga and
Moan (2007), Lotsberg and Sigurdsson (2005), Madsen,
Krenk, and Lind (2006), Moan, Hovde, and Blanker (1993)
and Paris and Erdogan (1963). The FM approach is cali-
brated to the probabilistic S-N model using the annual
probability of failure. To maintain the required target reli-
ability level, a reliability-based-inspection-planning approach
is presented.
2. Crêt de l’Anneau viaduct and its
monitoring system
2.1. Salient features
Crêt de l’Anneau viaduct is an eight span composite bridge
with a total length of 194.8 m, built in 1957. It has a rein-
forced concrete deck slab with a thickness of 170mm at
mid-span. The deck is supported by two parallel steel box
girders, which have an average height of 1.3 m. These box
girders are connected to each other by articulation at about
4 m from the support. The concrete used during construc-
tion had a cube strength of 40MPa, which now may be esti-
mated, approximately to 50MPa (gain in strength due to
continued hydration during 60 years of life).
The deck slab has an orthogonal grid reinforcement serv-
ing for double bending (sagging) behaviour in transverse
and longitudinal direction. An orthogonal grid is also pre-
sent in the hogging bending section, near the longitudinal
and transverse supports (near and above the box girders).
The grid reinforcement consists of different diameters rang-
ing from 10mm, 14mm and 18mm. 18mm at 500mm and
14mm at 100mm reinforcement are used in the main trans-
verse bending direction between two girders. Out of the two
diameters, 18mm reinforcement in transverse direction is
considered in the current study, where strain gauges are
installed. Clear cover to reinforcement is 20mm.
2.2. Fatigue behaviour
The identified critical part of this composite bridge is the
reinforced concrete slab (MCS, 2017, p. 41). The fatigue
behaviour of the reinforced concrete deck slab is mainly
governed by transverse bending between two girders; it con-
tributes also to local longitudinal bending under vehicle roll-
ing wheel loads, thus it is a double bending behaviour. The
stress levels in the steel box girder are very low and below
the endurance limit for the steel. Therefore, the current
study focuses only on reinforced concrete deck slab, and
especially on fatigue of the reinforcement in the tension
zone, since fatigue of concrete in the compression zone is
unlikely to occur (Rocha & Br€uhwiler, 2012, p. 1) if con-
crete is not suffering from any other deterioration mecha-
nisms like frost or aggregate alkali reaction. The behaviour
of the viaduct is studied considering:
 Fatigue of steel-reinforcement in tension zone and
fatigue of concrete in compression zone, using determin-
istic approach (Bayane, Mankar, Br€uhwiler, &
Sørensen, 2019).
 Fatigue reliability of concrete in compression zone, using
probabilistic approach (Mankar, Bayane, Sørensen, &
Br€uhwiler, 2019).
The results of these studies show that, for this particular
viaduct, fatigue of steel-reinforcement in tension zone is
critical compared to fatigue of concrete in compres-
sion zone.
2.3. Monitoring system
The MCS department at EPFL has installed eight electrical
strain gauges on longitudinal and transverse reinforcement
bars of two spans of the viaduct, at halfway between articu-
lation and support. Two more strain gauges are installed to
capture the response of the steel box girders. First, on the
bottom side of the top flange and second, on the bottom
side of the bottom flange. Furthermore, thermocouples are
installed to measure temperature variations in concrete and
steel parts of the viaduct. For details about monitoring
system, reference is made to MCS (2017), as shown in
Figures 1 and 2.
3. Results of monitoring and stochastic load model
3.1. Measurement of strain and calculation of stresses
A study of influence line diagram for the bridge shows that
the maximum stress range for the live loads due to traffic
can be expected at the mid-span between articulation and
support. At the same location strain, gauges are installed to
measure strain variations with a frequency of 50–100Hz.
This high frequency of the strain measurement captures all
the vehicles and the associated peaks in the responses.
Along with this high-frequency-traffic-strain measurements,
the strain gauges also capture a low-frequency-strain change
due to the temperature variation and the associated struc-
tural response. The two responses can be separated since
their frequencies vary largely. Figure 3 depicts strain meas-
urements and corresponding temperature effect.
2 A. MANKAR ET AL.
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The temperature effect can easily be removed from the
total response in order to obtain the response due to
vehicles only. Five to 10min averaging time for calculating
the mean temperature effect is generally sufficient. Moving
average method can be employed using Equation (1)
(National-Instruments, 2012). Once the temperature effect is
removed from the strains, stresses in the steel-reinforcement
can easily be obtained:
f yið Þ ¼ 12nþ 1
Xk¼iþn
k¼in
yk for N  n > i > n (1)
where
f yið Þ ¼ mean temperature effect,
n ¼ averaging time chosen,
N ¼ total number of data points.
3.2. Rain-flow counting and stress histogram
The stress histogram is obtained by rain-flow counting of
the strain data for a monitoring duration of 303 days. The
number of cycles required for failure are related only to the
stress range (and not to the mean-stress), which is similar
to the welded steel. The stress range histogram of transverse
reinforcement is shown in Figure 4. The fatigue life of the
Figure 1. Monitoring system installed on Crêt de l’Anneau viaduct, a view from bottom of viaduct. (Strain gauges locations are highlighted with explosions.)
Figure 2. Crêt de l’Anneau viaduct cross section (all dimensions are in m).
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viaduct can be estimated using the stress range histogram
(Figure 4) along with Equation (2) and Miner’s rule. As the
actual stresses (Figure 4) in the bridge are very low and the
bridge has a very high fatigue life. The reliability analysis is
illustrated through the actual histogram, which is scaled
such that the design equation, with characteristic values and
safety factors-DFF, presented in Section 4.2, is exactly
fulfilled. The scaling is performed on the stress range as
well as on the number of cycles.
3.3. Stochastic load model for reliability analysis
Uncertainty in the fatigue load (for this specific case, traffic
load) covers different aspects and each of them can be mod-
elled independently. These different aspects could be e.g.
measurement uncertainty in the strain measurements, as
these measurements are very accurate, a very small uncer-
tainty associated with measurement is assumed and mod-
elled as lognormal with a mean of 1.0 and a standard
deviation of 0.05, see Xw in Table 1.
Other uncertainties can be related to:
 Extrapolation of results to another location in the struc-
ture based on measurement at a certain location (this is
not considered here as strain gauges are installed at
exactly the same location).
 Extrapolation of the available results to a full year fatigue
load based on 303 days observations.
 Extrapolation of the results to the remaining life, which
includes year-to-year variations and increase in traffic
load and frequency with time.
Figure 3. Effect of temperature on strain measurements.
Figure 4. Stress histogram for transverse reinforcement.
Table 1. Stochastic model for W€ohler curve.
Parameter Distribution Mean Standard deviation Remark
D Lognormal 1 0.30 Model uncertainty related to PM Rule
Xw Lognormal 1 0.05 Uncertainty in strain measurements
Xn Lognormal 1 0.01 –0.1
þþ Uncertainty in number of vehicles
logk Normal 18.77 0.07 Location parameter in W€ohler curve
m Fixed 5 – Slope of W€ohler curve fixed to 5þ
 Normal 0 re Standard deviation of the error term
re Normal 0.39/0.20 0.06 Standard deviation of the error term
qlogk;re Deterministic 0.06 – Correlation coefficient between location
and standard deviation of error
Model uncertainty obtained by fitting lognormal distribution to test data in (CEB 1988, 1989).
þslope of W€ohler curve fixed to 5 as logk and m are highly correlated with correlation coefficient equal to 0.9997.
þþVariation in reliability index as function of standard deviation of Xn values is studied.Variation in reliability index as function of standard deviation of logK values is studied.
Values in bold indicates base values used for reliability analysis.
4 A. MANKAR ET AL.
-22-
Available traffic data for 303 days are extrapolated to the
total life of the structure by making the assumption of a
constant traffic over the entire completed life of 60 years;
this is a conservative assumption, as the traffic in the early
service duration of the structure is low compared to the pre-
sent traffic. For the future life of the structure, which is
60 years, 1% increase in the traffic volume each year is
assumed. Uncertainties associated with this extrapolation are
modelled as lognormal with a mean of 1.0 and standard
deviation of 0.10, see Xn in Table 1.
4. Reliability framework
The First Order Reliability Method (FORM) is used for the
reliability analysis (Madsen et al., 2006; Sørensen 2011)
through the open source Matlab-based toolbox FERUM
(Finite Element Reliability Using Matlab) (FERUM, 2010).
4.1. Stochastic material reinforcement in
reliability analysis
The deterministic W€ohler curves are recommended by vari-
ous international codes for the verification of reinforcement
fatigue (e.g. DNV OS C 502, 2012; (EN 1992-1, 2004;
MC1990, 1993; MC2010, 2013, etc.). These are used as basis
for establishing stochastic models together with statistical
analysis of the available test data for reinforcement fatigue
(Hansen & Heshe, 2001).
For reinforcement fatigue, the number of cycles required




logN ¼ logkm  logDrþ e (2)
where e models the uncertainty related to the SN-curve and
is assumed Normal distributed with the mean value and the
standard deviation equal to 0 and re respectively. The values
of logk; m; re are obtained by the Maximum Likelihood
Method (MLM) (Sørensen & Toft, 2010). As these parame-
ters are estimated based on limited set of the data there is a
statistical uncertainty, which is presented in Table 1. The
use of the MLM provides the option to include run-outs.
For more details about probabilistic model for fatigue
strength of reinforcing bars and associated uncertainties, ref-
erence is made to Rastayesh, Mankar, and Sørensen (2018).
4.2. Design equation and limit state equation
The design equation for reinforcement fatigue is developed








i ¼ 0 (3)
where
kc is the characterisitc value of k;
logkc ¼ logkmean  1:64  r; logkc corresponds to
95% quantile;
ni is the number of cycles experienced by the structure
for the ith stress range bin Dri;
j is the total number of bins;
TF is the fatigue life; TF ¼ FDF  TL; FDF is the fatigue-
design factor; TL is the service life time of the structure;
RD is modelling the ratio of design parameters, here the sec-
tion modulus of the deck slab;
Dri is the stress range for the ith bin:
Stress range for each bin is obtained directly by rain-flow
counting of the strain gauge measurements, see Section 3.2.
Stress range in each bin is multiplied by the ratio of the
design parameters (New design parameter/Original design
parameter). A specific value of Fatigue-Design Factor (FDF)
can be obtained by changing the ratio of design parameter.
The design equation (Equation (3)) can be transformed to a
limit state equation by introducing the stochastic variables,
as follows:




10  k XwRDDrið Þ
m ¼ 0 (4)
where t indicates the time 0 < t < TL in years: All other
terms in the limit state equation are explained in Table 1.
4.3. Calculation of reliability index
As explained in Section 3.2, the actual stresses in the bridge
are very low and the bridge has a very high fatigue life.
Therefore, the reliability analyses are performed using the
scaled fatigue load. The cumulative (accumulated) probabil-
ity of failure PF tð Þ in the time interval [0, t] is obtained:
PF tð Þ ¼ P g tð Þ  0
 
(5)
The probability of failure is estimated by FORM (see
Madsen et al., 2006). The corresponding reliability index
bðtÞ is obtained:
b tð Þ ¼ /1 PF tð Þð Þ (6)
where AðÞ is the standardised normal distribution function.
The annual probability of failure is obtained based on the
cumulative probability of failure:
DPF tð Þ ¼ PF tð Þ  PF tDtð Þ; t > 1 year (7)
where Dt ¼ 1year. The corresponding annual reliability
index is denoted Db:
5. Reliability results with the S-N approach
The current age of the bridge is 60 years, and it is investi-
gated if the bridge can be used for additional 60 years, i.e. a
total of 120 years. The reliability is assessed for the rein-
forced concrete deck slab with respect to fatigue failure of
the reinforcement.
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5.1. Code requirements for reliability analysis
The Swiss standard (SIA-269, 2016) provides guidelines for
assessing the safety of existing structures by a probabilistic
approach and presents a target reliability level in the form
of reliability indices based on the consequence of failure and
the efficiency of interventions (a unity value for the coeffi-
cient of efficiency of interventions is recommended by SIA-
269 (2016), when it is not determined during the examin-
ation phase, see table 2 in Appendix B of SIA-269, 2016). In
this study, a low efficiency of intervention is assumed con-
sidering that costs to rehabilitate an existing structure as
very high and consequences of structural failure are
assumed to be serious, which leads to a target annual reli-
ability index of 3.7. Efficiency of safety-related interventions
is expressed as the ratio of the risk reduction to the safety
costs, which is similar to relative cost of safety measure as
explained in probabilistic model code JCSS (2000).
EN 1990 (2002) provides some aspects for assessment of new
structures by a probabilistic approach and presents an indicative
target accumulated reliability index for life time of 50 years
against fatigue. It provides a range of target reliability from 1.5 to
3.8, based on the degree of inspect-ability, repair-ability and dam-
age tolerance (see table C2 in Appendix C of EN 1990, 2002).
5.2. Results of reliability analysis
Results of reliability analysis are presented for different val-
ues of Coefficient of Variation (CoV) of logK: CoV of logK
represents the variability in fatigue performance of the steel-
reinforcement. It may vary for different deliveries of the
steel-reinforcement. Lower the quality control in production
of the steel-reinforcement, larger the CoV and lower the
fatigue reliability. For current reliability analysis, CoV of
0.39 is used, which is obtained from test results (Hansen &
Heshe, 2001). While, CoV of 0.2 is standard CoV recom-
mended by DNVGL RP C203 (2016).
The variation of the cumulative reliability index along the
service life of the structure is presented in Figure 5 for the case
where the uncertainty in the vehicle number Xn is 1% and CoV
for logK is 0.39. The annual reliability index ðDbÞ as a function
of the FDF for different CoV values of logK representing
reinforcement from an arbitrary delivery is presented in Figure
6. It is observed that the CoV of logK has a large influence on
the reliability index values. To meet a target annual reliability
index of 3.7 with planned design life of 120 years, the required
FDF is of the order of 3.8 for CoV of 0.2 for logK; while the
needed FDF is of order of 4.4 for CoV of 0.39 for logK:
The annual reliability index ðbÞ as a function of the FDF
for different CoV values of logK is presented in Figure 7 for
120 years of design life. The cumulative reliability indices in
Figure 7 can be compared to the target reliability indices
indicated in EN 1990 (2002). A range of fatigue safety fac-
tors (FDF) required to achieve the accumulated target reli-
ability index can be obtained from Figure 7.
6. Fracture-mechanics (FM) approach
6.1. FM model for crack growth
This section presents a generic crack growth model based
on Paris-Erdogan law (Paris & Erdogan, 1963), for the main
Table 2. Stochastic parameters in FM Model.
Parameter Distribution Mean Std-Dev Remark
acr Normal 10.8mm 1.8mm Crack size at unstable fracture (SB)
ad Exponential 0.5, 1 ,5 mm 0.5, 1, 5 mm PoD assumed for AE_Tomography
logC Normal 12.738 0.11 Material parameter C, (DNVGL)
XS LogNormal 1 0.05 Uncertainty in monitored stress
Xn LogNormal 1 0.05 Uncertainty in number of vehicles
SB: Schl€afli and Br€uhwiler, (1998); DNVGL: DNVGL RP 0001 (2015).A sensitivity study is performed for different values of PoD.
Figure 5. Variation in Cumulative reliability index along service duration of
structure (FDF2 and TL¼120 years).
Figure 6. Annual reliability index as function of FDF.
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reinforcement of 18mm, at a critical fatigue location.
Experimental investigations show that the increment of
crack per stress cycle can be approximated as follows:
Da ¼ C ffiffiffiffiffipap DrY m (8)
The crack length increment Da is often very small com-
pared to the variation of am=2; therefore Da can be idealised
to be the differential quotient da=dN; where N is the num-
ber of cycles considered as a continuous parameter and
then, the solution a Tð Þ is given by Equation (9) (Ditlevsen &
Madsen, 1996). The geometry function or shape factor
Yð Þ is assumed to be 1.0 in Equation (9) and it shows suffi-
ciently accurate calibration with S-N approach (see Section
6.3):







 C  pm2  Drm  n  T




aðTÞ crack length at time T (years);
a0 initial crack length back calculated based on calibration
(see Section 6.3);
m & Cparameters in Paris’ law;
n Number of stress cycles per year with stress range Dr:
6.2. Limit state equation for FM
A limit state equation corresponding to FM model explained
in Section 6.1 can be written as Equation (10). This limit
state equation corresponds to the state when the crack size
ða Tð ÞÞ in the year under consideration reaches the critical
crack size ðaCÞ: The critical crack size is the crack size
where the unstable brittle fracture of reinforcement occurs
or when rupture occurs. This critical crack size ðaCÞ can be
calculated as the ultimate level of stress based on extreme
value theory, however for this paper critical crack size is
assumed as normal distributed with a mean value of 60% of
the diameter of reinforcement and a CoV of 0.1 (see Table
2 and Rocha & Br€uhwiler, 2012):












An outcome of an inspection cannot be related directly to
the damage obtained from the S-N approach. Therefore, the
FM approach with Paris-Erdogan law is used, where an
inspection outcome can be related to the crack size, which
is obtained from the FM approach. However, calculated
fatigue lives based on S-N data are more reliable than those
based on FM, as S-N data are derived directly from fatigue
tests; while FM is based on calculations where additional
parameters are required as input to the analysis. Thus, it is
reasonable to make a calibration such that the probability of
a fatigue failure based on fracture mechanics follows that of
S-N data (test data) until the first in-service inspection.
After the first inspection, the results will depend on the FM
model and the reliability of inspection method. The calibra-
tion purpose, it is assumed that crack growth starts at the
first stress cycle and then, the distribution of initial crack
size a0ð Þ is calibrated such that probability of a fatigue fail-
ure at a given number of stress cycles is similar to S-N
fatigue test data. Thus, this initial crack size is “fictitious” as
it can hardly correspond to real physical crack sizes
(DNVGL RP 0001, 2015).
Figure 8 presents the calibration of the FM approach
with S-N approach. Calibration for the current study is per-
formed such that the reliability index at the inspection year
for FM approach is achieved as for the S-N approach. For
the rest of the years, the calibration is performed, using a
least square fitting method. Two parameters are used here
for the calibration, namely the initial crack size a0ð Þ and the
FM approach mð Þ: The resulting amount of required in-ser-
vice inspection is highly correlated with this calibration
(Lotsberg, Sigurdsson, Fjeldstad, & Moan, 2016).
Figure 7. Cumulative reliability index as function of FDF (TL¼ 120 years for
mean values of re equal to 0.20 and 0.39).
Figure 8. Calibration of FM approach with S-N approach (FDF ¼ 1.5).
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6.4. Reliability updating using inspections
In order to maintain the reliability level, periodic inspec-
tions need to be performed. Information available through
inspections can be used to assess the current ‘health’ of the
structure as well as to predict its behaviour, by updating the
future failure probabilities. Currently, researchers focus
more on understanding fracture surface of reinforcement
after failure to know the crack propagation over the diam-
eter. Thus, these present techniques lack to measure the
crack size in reinforcement. However, researchers believe
that it is possible with Acoustic Emission (AE) tomography
(which could be part of a future work for other researchers).
In the current study, it is assumed that it is possible to
measure the crack size with unknown uncertainty, for the
purpose a sensitivity study is performed with different val-
ues of uncertainty ranging from 0.5 to 5mm. The crack size
obtained from inspection is used to update the reliability
indices, similar to offshore steel structures (DNVGL RP
0001, 2015). It is assumed that the reliability associated with
the AE tomography technique is described by a Probability
of Detection (PoD) curve (Sergio & Sørensen, 2012), see
Figure 9 and Equation (11), where ad models the smallest
detectable crack size:
POD að Þ ¼ Fad að Þ ¼ 1 e 
a
bð Þ (11)
where b is the expected value of ad and is assumed to be
equal to 0.5, 1 and 5mm.
The limit state equation corresponding to an inspection
event hð Þ; where no cracks are observed (crack size is less
than the detectable crack size ad), is modelled (see Equation
(12)). The inspection event hð Þ smaller than zero implies
that crack size is smaller than the detection ability of inspec-
tion method, resulting in no detection of crack while ðhÞ
larger than zero implies that crack size is larger than the
smallest detectable crack:
h Tinsp
  ¼ a Tð Þ  ad  0 (12)
The failure probability PF after an inspection event is
updated by calculating the conditional probability of failure,
given the inspection event is performed. Bayes’ rule is used
to obtain the updated failure probability, PUF ; as follows:
PUF ¼ P g Tð Þ  0jh Tinsp
   0	 

PUF ¼
P g Tð Þ  0 \ h Tinsp
   0	 

h Tinsp
   0 (13)
The numerator in the above equation
P g Tð Þ  0 \ h Tinsp
   0	 
 is calculated as the probability
of failure of a parallel system by FORM (Madsen et al.,
2006). The corresponding updated annual reliability index
can be obtained:
DbU Tð Þ ¼ ;1
P g Tð Þ  0jh Tinsp
   0	 

P g T1ð Þ  0jh Tinsp






T > Tinsp (14)
Figure 10 illustrates the variation of annual reliability
index along the service life the structure, at about 75 years
of life the annual reliability index is lower than threshold
value of 3.7 specified in SIA-269 (2016), thus it is assumed
that an inspection of reinforcement near the critical fatigue
location is performed at 60 years of life (current year) with
AE tomography and no crack was found. The failure prob-
ability is updated after the inspection event at 60th year,
and thus updated annual reliability after 60th year is
obtained for remaining service life until planned future life
of 120 years.
It is seen that for AE tomographic inspection with high
uncertainty, i.e. mean value of 5mm for PoD, there is no
gain in the form of updated failure probability ðPUF Þ: The
updated failure probability follows almost the same trend as
if there is no inspection performed. While with reduction in
the uncertainty for AE tomographic inspection to 0.5mm,
the gain in updated probability of failure ðPUF Þ is significant.
The updated failure probability ðPUF Þ crosses the target reli-
ability threshold at about 90 years of life instead of 75 years.
Further, if a second inspection is performed at 90 years with
Figure 9. Assumed PoD for AE tomography. Figure 10. Reliability updating based on AE tomographic inspections for FM
approach (FDF30).
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an assumed outcome of no crack detection, then for the
remaining service life, the structure meets the requirement
of the minimum acceptable level of annual reliability index
of 3.7.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, the probabilistic framework for estimating
fatigue reliability of bridges is presented. As a case study,
fatigue reliability of Crêt de l’Anneau viaduct is presented by
formulating the stochastic models for action effects (strain/
stress) based on monitoring data and for fatigue resistance of
steel-reinforcement based on fatigue test data of steel-
reinforcement. It has been observed that the reliability indices
for the structure are larger than the acceptable level. As the
structure considered in the case study exhibits a very high
reliability level with respect to fatigue failure of the reinforce-
ment, the traffic load on the structure can be increased along
with the life extension of the structure.
CoV of logK has been found to have a large influence on
the reliability index values. To meet a target annual reliability
index of 3.7 with a planned design life of 120 years, the
required FDF is of the order of 3.8 for CoV of 0.2 for logK;
while the needed FDF is of order of 4.4 for CoV of 0.39
for logK: FDF of 3.8 can be interpreted deterministically as
the designer should consider designing the structure with a
fatigue life of 3.8  120¼ 456 years to achieve a target annual
reliability index of 3.7 at the end of 120 years of service life
when CoV of logK is 0.2 while a fatigue life of
4.4  120¼ 528 years needs to be used if CoV of logK is 0.39.
No noticeable variation in the reliability index is
observed for a sensitivity study of the uncertainty associated
with vehicle numbers Xn with CoV ranging from 1% to
10%. However, it is seen that changes in uncertainty associ-
ated with logK result in large variations in the reliability
index. Thus, focus should be on reducing the uncertainty in
logK in order to take decisions. It is observed that calibra-
tion of FM approach with S-N approach works well for
reinforcement as well similar to offshore oil and gas steel
structures using Paris-Erdogan law.
Furthermore, updating the reliability using inspection
information by the FM approach is a very useful tool to
assess the reliability of the existing assets, however it should
be noted that outcome of these updates in safety assessment
(or failure probability) is highly dependent on the uncer-
tainty associated with the inspection technique and more
work is needed to develop inspection techniques for rein-
forcements, especially methods that can give indirect infor-
mation on the fatigue damage state of the reinforcement.
The current approach uses only fatigue limit state at the
component level reliability, it would be interesting to see the
results which include the system level reliability coupled
with the ultimate failure of bridge decks.
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Abstract: The paper presents research results from the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Innovative Training
Network INFRASTAR in the field of reliability approaches for decision-making for wind turbines and
bridges. This paper addresses the application of Bayesian decision analysis for installation of heating
systems in wind turbine blades in cases where an ice detection system is already installed in order
to allow wind turbines to be placed close to highways. Generally, application of ice detection and
heating systems for wind turbines is very relevant in cases where the wind turbines are planned to be
placed close to urban areas and highways, where risks need to be considered due to icing events,
which may lead to consequences including human fatality, functional disruptions, and/or economic
losses. The risk of people being killed in a car passing on highways near a wind turbine due to blades
parts or ice pieces being thrown away in cases of over-icing is considered in this paper. The probability
of being killed per kilometer and per year is considered for three cases: blade parts thrown away as a
result of a partial or total failure of a blade, ice thrown away in two cases, i.e., of stopped wind turbines
and of wind turbines in operation. Risks due to blade parts being thrown away cannot be avoided,
since low strengths of material, maintenance or manufacturing errors, mechanical or electrical failures
may result in failure of a blade or blade part. The blade (parts) thrown away from wind turbines in
operation imply possible consequences/fatalities for people near the wind turbines, including in areas
close to highways. Similar consequences are relevant for ice being thrown away from wind turbine
blades during icing situations. In this paper, we examine the question as to whether it is valuable to
put a heating system on the blades in addition to ice detection systems. This is especially interesting
in countries with limited space for placing wind turbines; in addition, it is considered if higher power
production can be obtained due to less downtime if a heating system is installed.
Keywords: risk assessment; value of action analysis; icing conditions; wind turbine; blade;
probability; highway
1. Introduction
Wind energy is one of the leading sources of renewable energy in Denmark and other countries.
Wind energy is increasingly being used in cold climate locations [1] where icing can be a significant
issue that should be taken into account in a risk assessment related to the area around wind turbines.
An environmental impact assessment has to be performed, e.g., when it is planned to locate wind
turbines in areas where people are living and in cases where it is planned to place wind turbines near
a road or highway. Generally, the safety factors used for the design of wind turbines do not cover
such situations, since safety factors have been calibrated assuming that there is no or almost no risk
of human fatalities in case of the failure of parts of a wind turbine. Ice accretion could have a direct
Energies 2019, 12, 2653; doi:10.3390/en12142653 www.mdpi.com/journal/energies
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impact on wind turbine operation, such as measurement errors, power losses, mechanical and electrical
failures, and safety hazard problems [2]. Several investigations are ongoing in order to establish rules
and guidelines related to icing. For instance, icing could affect the functionality of anemometers if they
are unheated, see [3]. In Germany, wind turbines are not allowed to operate during icing situations,
see [4]. Several reports are available showing that some wind turbines in Sweden during the 2002 and
2003 winters were forced to stop for seven weeks. Statistics from Sweden show that in winter months,
92% of full stops are caused because of icing [5]. In Germany, 85% of full stops of wind turbines in the
mountains were caused by icing [6]. During the design stage, a functional ice detection system can be
planned to be installed; subsequently, the wind turbine will be shut down if icing is detected by the ice
detection systems.
Most of the de-icing and anti-icing techniques used for wind turbines are inspired by the aviation
industry; all these techniques can be classified into two types: passive and active. As an example,
for passive techniques, ice-phobic and hydrophobic coatings can be used; furthermore, for active
techniques, electrothermal blade heating, heating with microwaves, warm air heating can be applied.
However, all of them have some disadvantages. These systems are generally unreliable, and therefore
energy losses occur, and the effectiveness of the system decrease [2,7,8].
Ice detection systems are needed to make de-icing and anti-icing systems work. Double
anemometer and vibration sensors are often used, as they are cheap; however, they have some
weak points. For example, in double anemometers, since humidity is measured relatively, it may lead
to an incorrect prediction of icing, which will then affect the wind turbine operation [9]. Another
weakness point for double anemometers is related to the location of where they are installed; since icing
is increasing with height, a double anemometer will always predict less icing compared to the amount
of icing at the most critical location, especially when the turbine is parked [10]. Another shortcoming
occurs due to increased measurement errors in case of low temperatures for unheated anemometers [11].
Furthermore, vibration sensors cannot detect icing during stall operation [10]. Optical sensors or
video cameras seem more reliable than the aforementioned instruments, e.g., Remote Ice Detection
Equipment (RIDE) [12].
In this paper, we consider whether it is worthwhile putting heating systems on the blades when
there is the possibility of icing. Situations are considered in which an ice detection system is already
installed. Different failure scenarios related to blade failures and icing will be presented in Section 2.
In Section 3, risk assessment is described taking to account the distance of wind turbines to highways.
Risk is estimated as the probability (per km and per year) that a person in a car will be hit (and
killed) by ice pieces or parts of wind turbine blades. It is assumed that a row of wind turbines is
placed along the highway. The risk is determined as a function of the distance from the wind turbines
to the highway. Our results could provide decision-makers with a tool for deciding whether wind
turbines should be placed near a highway and whether heating systems should be installed. This risk
assessment and a case study are presented in Sections 3 and 4, and can be used as decision support for
designers at sites with limited space and in which wind turbines need to be placed as close as possible
to highways. In Section 5, the Value of Action approach is presented as the basis for quantifying
whether it is worthwhile installing a heat detection system for wind turbine blades exposed to icing,
and in Section 6, a case study is presented to illustrate the decision problem and how it can be solved.
-31-
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2. Failure Scenarios
The following scenarios are considered in the assessment of risks for the surroundings of a wind
turbine:
(1) A part of a wind turbine blade or the whole blade may fail/collapse and be thrown away from
the turbine;
(2) Icing may occur when the wind turbine is in operation, and ice pieces may be thrown away;
(3) The wind turbine may be stopped in situations with icing, but ice pieces may be thrown away
due to high wind speeds.
The reasons for wind turbine blade failures may be the extremely low strength of the materials
(within random variations of strength parameters), manufacturing errors, maintenance errors or
extreme environmental conditions (within random variations of environmental parameters and
accounting for the effect of the control system). Ice throw can be considered to be similar to a slingshot
effect. Ice may be blown from the rotor blades in cases with strong wind when the wind turbine
is parked or idling, or thrown away when the wind turbine is in operation. In a risk assessment,
mechanical and electrical failures may lead to blade or blade fragment failures; fire and ice risks may
be considered as similar events with the main difference between them in the risk assessment being
related to their frequency of occurrence [13]. An icing event of a wind turbine near a highway is
depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Icing in a wind turbine near a highway.
A conservative rule suggested by Seifert states that the risk of ice-throw from an operational wind
turbine has to be investigated for roads, paths or other objects of interest if the wind turbine is placed
within the following distance from a road [3]:
1.5 (rotor diameter + hub height), (1)
To determine the probability of adverse events in the affected area around the wind turbine,
the following parameters should be considered [14]:
• Hub height
• Rotor diameter
• Rotor revolution under icing conditions
• Wind properties (distribution of wind speed and direction)
• Ice fragment properties
-32-
Energies 2019, 12, 2653 4 of 15
In [15], an icing model is proposed based on measurements in Germany. Some challenges were
observed by this study for ice forecasting, such as the high sensitivity to parameters like liquid water
content, droplets median diameter, wind, and temperature.
Ice properties/ice pieces are often classified into four scenarios based on a study by TÜV [14]:
• Rime ice, mass: 90 g (scenario A), and 240 g (scenario B);
• Clear ice, mass: 70 g (scenario C) and 180 g (scenario D).
Based on the TÜV study, which considered a typical wind turbine of 141 m hub height and 117 m
rotor diameter, scenario B and D are identified as scenarios that can cause fatalities, and in cases of 90 g
rime ice (Scenario A) and 70 g clear ice (Scenario C), slight injuries might occur [14].
In another study, rime ice was classified into five cases [16]: (1) 0 to 0.5 kg/m, (2) 0.5 to 0.9 kg/m,
(3) 0.9 to 1.6 kg/m, (4) 1.6 to 2.8 kg/m and (5) 2.8 to 5.0 kg/m, for which observations from wind turbines
in Quebec showed that the second class could be dangerous [17].
In the WECO (Wind Energy Production in Cold Climate) project [18], the frequency of ice fall
events is estimated based on observations from a wind turbine by counting ice pieces around a test site
in Switzerland, where 200 ice falls over three winters were measured.
3. Risk Assessment
Risk has a variety of definitions, see, e.g., the glossary of the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) [19].
The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) refers to risk as an uncertain and severe consequence
of an event or activity [20]. Zio [21] presented a quantitative definition of risk taking into consideration
accident scenarios, consequences, uncertainty, and body of knowledge. In this paper, the approach by
JCSS [22] is basically applied; here, risk is defined considering an activity with n events, each with
probabilities Pi and with potential consequences Ci. The risk R is defined as the sum of the products





In Figure 2, the process of risk-based decision analysis in this case study is shown. First, it is
necessary to consider the scenarios in an icing event to determine the influencing parameters, e.g.,
ice can be thrown away from the wind turbine when it is operating, or ice can be thrown away from
the stopped or idling wind turbine. Furthermore, it has to be included that the wind turbine blade
parts can be thrown away because of the partial or total failure of the blades. Next, the model is linked
to a car passing on a highway near the wind turbine, and its properties, such as speed and number of
passengers. Afterward, it is necessary to take into account possible ice detection and blade heating
systems. Subsequently, risk scenarios are identified by the concept above for calculating risk, and in
parallel, sensitive parameters in the model are identified. The calculated risks are compared with
the accepted risks, and, using the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) principle, risks can
be considered to be acceptable or not. This process can be expanded using information from SHM
(Structural Health Monitoring).
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Figure 2. Risk-based decision analysis in this case study.
4. Case Study—Risk Assessment
An example of risk assessment for wind turbines close to highways in Denmark is presented in
this section, accounting for the risks mentioned above from falling parts from wind turbine blades
in conditions of total or partial damage, as well as ice thrown from wind turbine blades in the case
of icing.
In [24], the occurrence of icing was divided into four conditions: heavy, moderate, light, and no
icing; Denmark can be considered as a country with moderate icing conditions. It is presumed that a
row of wind turbines is placed along a highway with a typical total height of 150 m and a spacing of
500 m along the road. Data is collected from wind turbines both in Denmark and overseas [25].
The following assumptions are made [25]:
• The average drag coefficient of ice pieces is assumed to be 0.6, the density of air is assumed at
1.3 kg/m3 and that of ice is assumed to be 800 kg/m3;
• Ice pieces need to be more than 2 cm in thickness in order to be thrown away without being split
to smaller pieces on the way;
• The mean speed of vehicles is assumed to 88 km/h on Danish highways (based on Danish road
statistics);
• 1.5 people will die in the case of hitting parts (based on Danish road statistics, on average 1 or
2 people usually sits in cars, the average is considered in this case study);
-34-
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• The probability of being killed when an ice piece or blade part hits a car is assumed to be one,
since only large objects are considered;
• The 10-min mean wind speeds, νi, are assumed to discretized to 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 m/s;
• The area of a vehicle is assumed to be 10 m2, which is average for a passenger car;
• Ice pieces larger than 3 mm are used with an occurrence rate of 0.175 times per year (in Denmark).
This modeling is subject to considerable uncertainty, since the ice pieces can become larger on the
blades because of wind speed or during blade rotation.
In the following figures, models for each of the above three cases are derived based on the models
described in [25], as well as ballistic calculations using the models in [26].
The probability (per km per year) that a car is hit by ice pieces, PA, is estimated in icing conditions
based on the following model [25]:
PA =
∑











] P(V = νi) (3)
where
V0 speed of the vehicle
S length of road section considered
A(s) area of a car
D spacing between the wind turbines placed along the highway
PZ(s, νi) probability (per km per year) that an ice piece lands in the distance s from the wind turbine if
the mean wind speed is νi. A uniform probability distribution is assumed within the throwing distance
Ri at the mean wind speed νi. Furthermore, using a uniform directional distribution of the wind speed,
PZ(s, νi) is determined by




ν number of icing events per year
P(V = νi) probability that the mean wind speed at hub height in connection with icing is equal to νi.
The risk, here introduced as the expected number of persons, RA, per year per kilometer that will
be killed by a wind turbine, is estimated by
RA = 1.5 PA PD (5)
where it is conservatively assumed that the probability of being killed when an ice piece or blade part
hits a vehicle is PD = 1.
A similar equation is presented by [25] for the last scenario.
Figure 3 shows RA for ice throw from an operational wind turbine as a function of distance (d) to
a road (in m) with the tower height of 100 m and the total height of 150 m. Approximately,
RA,TO = 5·10−9e−0.050 d (6)
Figure 4 illustrates RA for an idling (parked) wind turbine as a function of distance (d) to a road
(in m) with a tower height of 100 m and a total height of 150 m. Approximately
RA,TI = 2·10−9e−0.068 d (7)
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Figure 3. The risk RA,TO per year per kilometer due to icing events as a function of distance to the road
for wind turbines in parked position, from [25].
Figure 4. The risk RA,TI per year per kilometer due to icing events as function of distance to road for
wind turbines in parked position, from [25].
Figure 5 shows RA due to total or partial failure/collapse of a wind turbine as a function of distance
(d) to a road (in m), with a tower height of 100 m and a total height of 150 m. Approximately
RA,BT = 5·10−12e−0.009 d (8)
Figure 5. The risk RA,BT per year per kilometer as function of distance to the road for blade parts
thrown away from the wind turbine, from [25].
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Based on these probabilistic models, the next section presents the basis for decision making and
for estimating the Value of Action (VoA). The decision problem that will be considered is whether
a heating system should be implemented, assuming that an ice detection system has already been
established. This is done for different distances between the road and the row of wind turbines, and can
be used as a basis for determining the acceptable distance to the highway using an ice detection system,
and next, whether a heating system should be installed.
5. Value of Action Analysis
The concept of Value of Action (VoA) was introduced by Thöns and Kapoor, see [27,28],
and constitutes a further development of the Value of Information (VoI) analysis from Raiffa and
Schlaifer in [29] and its application in engineering, see e.g., [30–33]. The VoI is defined as the expected
utilities gained by obtained (conditional) or predicted (expected) information, including their costs
and consequences, while the VoA is different in that the expected utility is gained only on the basis of
predicted or implemented actions. The quantification of VoA can be calculated as the difference between
the expected utilities of the predicted action and a system state analysis. Based on quantification of
VoA, it is possible to provide a decision basis as to whether to implement an action or not. To figure
out whether it is beneficial to install the heating systems on the wind turbine blades following the risk
assessment results above, a VoA analysis was carried out.
As discussed above, when it is planned to locate a wind turbine location near to highways, one of
the interests from owners’ perspectives is in reducing risk owing to falling parts from wind turbines
in the event of total or partial damage, and from ice thrown from the wind turbines in the case of
icing, as shown in Figure 6. The general objective is to ensure normal and steady energy generation,
which can be achieved with additional investments in SHM techniques, such as implementing an ice
detection system and a blade heating system. Initial investments in SHM techniques can increase the
cost of the wind turbine. However, the shutdown of the wind turbine will result in loss of energy
production, thus reducing the income of the owner or reputation loss. The major constraints regarding
wind turbines close to highways are that falling parts from wind turbines may lead to a traffic accident,
damage to cars, and even to the injury or fatality of people. To minimize the overall cost of wind
turbine management, it is essential to decide whether to implement an ice detection system, and when
to turn on the blade heating system.
Figure 6. Illustration of risk scenarios of wind turbines close to highways.
A situation is considered in which the risks due to parts being thrown from failed/collapsed wind
turbine blades are assumed to be difficult to reduce; therefore, only the reduction of risk due to icing
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can be reduced. It is assumed that an ice detection system has already been installed. The question
is: is it worthwhile installing a heating system in the blades? When ice is detected, should the wind
turbine be shut down directly, or should the ice heating system be turned on? The application of the
value of action analysis with regard to the installation of heating systems in wind turbine blades in
cases where an ice detection system has already been installed aims at answering the question as to
whether it is of value putting a heating system on the blades.
The illustration of the full decision tree is shown in Figure 7. The decision choice is h0, no heating
system, or h1, with the heating system. By installing the heating, there would be a heating system cost
CH. The decision choice of action will be a0, do nothing, a1, stop operating, and a2, turn on the heating
system; moreover, if operation stops, there will be a production loss CL. Given the monitoring strategy
e1, with ice detection system, data of the ice mass will be collected, and when the mass of ice is over a
certain threshold, a warning will be given. Two monitoring outcomes will be provided: z1, indicating
ice, and z2, not indicating ice. For different choices of actions based on the monitoring outcomes,
the wind turbine could be under different states; for example, θ1, safe state, θ2, at risk of blades being
thrown away, θ3, at risk of ice being thrown away when the wind turbine is non-operational, and θ4,
at risk of ice being thrown away when the wind turbine is operating. The owners’ decisions with
respect to actions regarding the wind turbine are based on the indication of ice detection, and the
consequences, benefits, and costs. The consequences of parts falling from wind turbines may include
traffic accidents, damage of cars, and even the injury or fatality of people, CF. The most important
consequences related to whether a heating system is used or not are those which affect the risk of a
person in a vehicle potentially being killed due to falling parts or ice pieces from a wind turbine. If a
heating system has not been installed, downtimes can last several days or even weeks due to persistent
ice on the blades [34]. Therefore, the production loss CL can range from hundreds to thousands of
Euro. If a heating system is installed, the wind turbine can continue working with benefits BL per year.
Figure 7. Illustration of the full decision tree for risk assessment of the value of action in the framework
of wind turbines close to highways.
It is assumed that the ice detection system provides precise and accurate information. Therefore,
if equipped with an ice heating system, when ice is detected, the choice of action could be to a2, turn on
the heating system. The wind turbine will continue working when the heating system is turned on,
but there will be a cost for installation of the heating system CH. The ice will melt after turning on
the heating system, and the only risk left in this case will be the risk of blades being thrown away
RA,BT. If no ice heating system has been installed, when ice is detected, the choice of action could be a1,
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stop operating; there will be a production loss during the downtime, but the risk of ice being thrown
away under operation condition RA,TO will be reduced. However, there is still the risk of ice being
thrown away under no operation condition RA,TI, as well as the risk of blades being thrown away
RA,BT. If the ice detection system did not indicate ice, whether a heating system has been installed or
not, the choice of action will be a0, do nothing. An illustration of the choice of decision action scenario
for wind turbines in icing events close to highways is shown in Figure 8.
Figure 8. Illustration of the modeled decision scenario and utilized models. A dashed decision node
(rectangle) stands for the use of a decision rule and a dashed chance node (circle) for the use of perfect
information provided by the ice detection system.
Following the choice of decision scenario in Figure 9, when the ice detection system detects the
ice, the choice of action when there is no ice heating system will be to stop operating, which leads to
a utility uh0 . The choice of action if the ice heating system is installed will be to turn on the heating,
which results a utility uh1 ; the value of installing the heating system will be calculated as:
VoA = uh1 − uh0 (9)
Figure 9. Computational results of VoA in dependence of percentage of downtime per year due to
icing ∆T and distance of wind turbine to a highway d (a) and VoA with critical down time point when
VoA = 0 (b).
It is assumed that when the ice heating system is turned on, the ice will melt, and if the ice is
thrown away, the risks under both operation and non-operation will be significantly reduced, leaving
only the risk of blades thrown away RA,BT remaining, so that, considering the service life TSL, the cost
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of the heating system CH, the cost of possible fatality CF and the benefits of production BL, the spacing
between wind turbines placed along a highway D, and discounting factor γ, the utility of the heating
system uh1 can be obtained by adding the contributions from each year T:
uh1 =
∑TSL









Here, the ratio of downtime per year in which the wind turbine will be stopped ∆TBT. for blade
repair if blade has been thrown away is assumed.
When there is no ice heating system, and the wind turbine stops operating, given the ice detection
warning, the risk of consequences of ice being thrown away under operation will be reduced, and the
remaining risk will be of ice being thrown away under non-operation RA,TI and the risk of blades being
thrown away RA,BT. Considering the production loss CL. during this period, the number of icings per









((RA,TI + RA,BT) D CF + PA,BT D BL ∆TBT + ν CL ∆Tice) 1
(1+γ)T
(11)
The estimate of the benefits of production BL (CL = BL ) per year is based on [35]:
BL = P A f ( S + a) 365·24 (12)
where P is the rated power of the machine MW, A is the turbine availability factor, f is the capacity
factor, A is the sales price of electricity kW/h and a is the feed-in-tariff.
6. Case Study—Value of Action Analysis
The summary of the probability (per km) that a car will be hit by ice or a blade thrown away, as
well as the costs and benefits analysis parameters, are shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. Table 2
is from [35]; the power of the wind turbine is 3.6 MW, a capacity factor of 0.45 is assumed, turbine
availability factor is 0.95, feed-in-tariff is €0.12/kWh, with a rough electricity price of €0.3/kWh, so that
there will be 5.66·106. Euro per year of production benefit. The total costs of the wind turbine CI is
€2 ·107. The discounting factor γ is 0.05. The cost of heating CH is assumed to be on the order of 5%
of the total costs of the wind turbine, considering the equipment costs, installation costs and energy
consumption costs [34], which are assumed to be 106 Euro. The fatality costs of 1.5 person in a vehicle
being killed are assumed to be 3·106 . Euro, based on [36].
Table 1. Summary of probability (per km) that a car will be hit by ice or blade thrown away.
Remark Parameter Equation
The probability (per km) that a car is hit by ice pieces
due to ice thrown from an operational wind turbine
as a function of distance d to a highway
PA,TO PA,TO = 3.33·10−9e−0.005 d
The probability (per km) that a car is hit by ice pieces
due to ice thrown from an idling wind turbine as a
function of distance d to a highway
PA,TI PA,TI = 1.33·10−9e−0.068 d
The probability (per km) that a car is hit by total or
partial failure/collapse of a wind turbine blade as a
function of distance d to a highway
PA,BT PA,BT = 3.33·10−12e−0.009d
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Table 2. Summary of costs and benefits analysis parameters.
Parameter and Remark Value Parameter and Remark Value
CF Cost of fatality for 1.5 person €3 ·106 P Power of wind turbine 3.6 MW
CH Cost of the heating system €1·106 A Turbine availability factor 0.95
γ Discounting factor 0.05 f Capacity availability factor 0.45
TSL service life 20 years S Electricity price: Euro per-kWh €0.3/kWh
ν Number of icings per year 0.175 a feed-in-tariff €0.12/kWh
D spacing between wind turbines 500 m ∆TBT down time due to bladerepair if blade thrown away 1 year
Following Equations (8)–(12) and Tables 1 and 2, the computational results of VoA are shown in
Figure 10. When VoA < 0, it means that it is not worthwhile installing the heating system. When VoA
> 0, it is recommended that the heating system be installed. Based on Figure 9a, the VoA will increase
with the increase in downtime, which means that it will be more beneficial to install the heating system
if the downtime due to icing on the blades is longer. However, the impact of the distance of the wind
turbine from a highway d is comparably small, which can be explained by the low variation of risk
model independence of distance in Section 5. The critical downtime in the case study when VoA = 0 is
at ∆T =. 30 days, as shown in Figure 9b. Therefore, if the down time due to ice on the blades is less
than 30 days, it is beneficial to just shut down the wind turbine instead of installing a heating system.
If the downtime is longer than 30 days, it is worthwhile installing the ice heating system on the blades.
Figure 10. Parametric analysis regarding Value of Action (VoA) with respect to the power of the wind
turbine (a), electricity price (b), cost of the heating system (c), and number of icings per year (d).
To investigate how the model factors, for example, the power of the wind turbine P, the electricity
price S, the cost of the heating system CH, the number of icings per year ν, and the influence the choice
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of action, a parametric analysis is carried out. The results are shown in Figure 10. If the down time
is the same, based on Figure 10a, the higher the power of wind turbine P is, the higher the VoA will
be, which means that it will be more beneficial to install a heating system on larger wind turbines.
The same trend goes for the electricity sales price S in Figure 10b; it is more beneficial to install the
heating system when the electricity sales price is high. This also applies to the number of icings per
year, ν, in Figure 10c; it is more worthwhile installing a heating system when icing per year is greater.
Meanwhile, in Figure 10d, the higher the cost of the heating system, CH, is, the smaller the benefit of
VoA will be.
7. Conclusions
A probabilistic model and a risk assessment model are described for the assessing the consequences
related to icing and the associated risk of ice pieces being thrown away from a wind turbine and
potentially hitting a vehicle on a road near the wind turbine. In addition, the risk from blades and
parts of blades being thrown away from a wind turbine in case of blade failures also needs to be
accounted in the risk assessment. This paper considers the application of Bayesian decision analysis
for decision-making with respect to the installation of heating systems in wind turbine blades in cases
where ice detection systems have already been installed in order to allow wind turbines to be placed
close to highways.
Furthermore, the application of Value of Action (VoA) is presented for the decision problem related
to installation of a heating system in situations where an ice detection system is already available.
Decision trees for the VoA are developed, together with the corresponding utility functions, making it
possible to quantify whether it is valuable to put a heating system on the blades in addition to the
ice detection systems. This is especially interesting in countries with limited space for placing wind
turbines. The model makes it possible to investigate, e.g., whether higher power production can be
obtained with less downtime when a heating system is installed.
An illustrative case study is considered, presenting the details of the risk modelling and the Value
of Action. Risk is calculated as a function of distance from the wind turbines to the highways. The risk
owing to ice throw in operation mode is slightly higher than in the parked position. The spacing
between the wind turbines and the height of them did not have a major impact.
The case study with regard to quantification of the Value of Action on wind turbines close to
highways with respect to icing events provides a general decision basis for deciding whether or not to
install ice heating systems given the condition that ice detection systems have already been installed.
The results show that the decision result is highly dependent on the duration of downtime due to ice
on the blades.
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Abstract: This paper presents a methodology based on the failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)
to analyze the failures in the power stage of wind-fuel cell hybrid energy systems. Besides,
fault tree analysis (FTA) is applied to describe the probabilistic failures in the vital subcomponents.
Finally, the reliability assessment of the system is carried out for a five-year operation that is guaranteed
by the manufacturer. So, as the result, the reliability analysis proves that the metal oxide semiconductor
field effect transistor (MOSFET) and electrolytic capacitor are the most critical components that
introduce damages in the power circuit. Moreover, a comparative study on the reliability assessment
by the exponential distribution and the Weibull distribution show that the B1 lifetime obtained
by the Weibull distribution is closer to reality.
Keywords: failure mode and effect analysis; failure mechanism; power stage; reliability; wind-fuel
cell hybrid energy systems
1. Introduction
Renewable energy systems are rapidly growing in the power sector industry, such as wind
turbines, solar energy, and also fuel cells [1–4]. Renewable energy sources are proliferating even
more than the expected estimations, although each has its pros and cons. For instance, wind
turbines are dependent on wind means climate condition, while fuel cells demand hydrogen-rich
fuel. Furthermore, one tricky issue is to keep power production stable; hybrid energy systems
facilitate such disadvantages [5,6]. A hybrid wind-fuel cell system usually includes a wind turbine,
proton exchange membrane fuel cells (PEMFC), ultracapacitor, an electrolyzer, and a power convertor.
Wind turbine power output variations because of wind speed change could be reduced by a fuel
cell stack. In this system, the wind turbine and the fuel cell supply the load simultaneously;
in order to save extra energy produced by the wind turbine when wind is over speeding, it is
converted to hydrogen utilizing an electrolyzer to be used in the fuel cell when needed. Minimizing
voltage fluctuations in the system and generating AC voltage are, respectively, the ultracapacitors
and the power converter functions [7,8]. PEMFC is a kind of fuel cell being developed by General
Electric Corporation as a renewable energy system in many applications, such as transportation,
stationary applications, and portable applications, as well as hybrid energy systems [9,10]. Generally,
PEMFCs are divided into three main subsystems that contain: Power conditioner, stack, and balance
Electronics 2019, 8, 1412; doi:10.3390/electronics8121412 www.mdpi.com/journal/electronics
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of plant (BoP) [11]. A power conditioner is one of the crucial subsystems, in which the DC/DC
converter regulates the output from the PEMFC stack to a fixed DC voltage [12]. The power
stage component is a critical part of the power conditioner subsystem in a PEMFC system which
includes active and passive subcomponents. Active subcomponents consist of primary metal oxide
semiconductor field effect transistors (MOSFETs) and secondary MOSFETs, which both could contain
eight transistors, and their functions are to control the electrical current, voltage regulation, boost
switching, and also rectification. Besides, there are passive subcomponents including: Input and output
electrolyte capacitors, transformer, choke, varistor, shunt resistor, fuse, and heatsink. The functions
of these components are filtering, transmission of current and voltage, and interconnection between
different components. MOSFETs as active subcomponents and electrolytic capacitors as passive
subcomponents are more significant due to their functions and applications. MOSFETs are used
as a switch where the electrical current passes at a desired time interval. In addition, electrolyte
capacitors work as a storage for the electrical energy and stabilization of the current voltage [13–15].
There are many studies of capacitors’ reliability and failure analysis [16–18] and this paper focuses
on the MOSFET as a critical active subcomponent in the power stage and carrying out a diverse failure
mechanism analysis of it by failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) technique.
Achieving a product that can meet customers’ demands with the best design, construction,
production, and operation costs is one of the main goals in all industries [19,20]. Reliability is
a critical criterion of a product’s performance, expressed in both deterministic and probabilistic
approaches. In the deterministic expression, failure modes and mechanisms are often discussed based
on observations, while in the probabilistic case, the failure issues are studied based on statistics [21].
Function investigations and analysis of each system require an individual function analysis of each
component, its subsets, and their interaction. The advantages and disadvantages of a component
entirely depend on the subsets it is used in. Evidently, the use of defective components with a short
lifetime will reduce the efficiency and lifetime of the component and the main system. Therefore,
prior to the reliability evaluation of a system, its related components, and failure modes, as well
as failure mechanisms of its components and even critical subcomponents, should be adequately
comprehended [22].
The literature review shows that the FMEA method is an essential step in conducting a failure
mode and failure mechanisms evaluation [11,23]. The FMEA method has been used in multiple
types of industry and it is based on discovering, arranging, and decreasing the failures or faults.
The majority of the literature available on the PEMFC systems have performed a brief study about
failure modes and failure mechanisms [24–26], also most studies were on system-level and non-electrical
parts of the PEMFC system, such as electrochemical parts, BoP, and stack part [27–29]. Reliability,
availability, and risk study of different parts of the PEMFC are important issues that should be assessed
completely. For system recognition, there are main steps, which are significant for the identification
of the systems and it is the basis for this study. FMEA focuses on prevention by facilitating process
improvement and identifying and eliminating concerns as well as the development of a process or
design [30].
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is used for reliability assessment of a system. The fault tree approach
is a deductive process by means of which an undesirable event, called the top event, is postulated,
and the possible ways for this event to occur are systematically deduced. The deduction process is
performed so that the fault tree embodies all component failures (i.e., failure modes) that contribute
to the occurrence of the top event. The fault tree itself is a graphical representation of the various
combinations of failures that led to the occurrence of the top event [31]. The fault tree itself is a logical
model, and thus represents the qualitative characterization of the system logic. There are, however,
many quantitative algorithms to evaluate fault trees. For example, the concept of cut sets can also be
applied to fault trees by using the Boolean algebra method. This methodology has been used in several
applications as well as PEMFCs [32,33]. The focus of the FTA suggested in this paper is the failure of
power stage as the top event by considering filters as input and output.
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In this paper, the FMEA method is used for the power stage component as a central part
of the power conditioner subsystem of a PEMFC system. FMEA as a technique in reliability
analysis is used to rank the estimated risk priority with various potential failure modes for critical
subcomponents and potential failure modes/mechanisms. According to the FTA of the power stage, it
is demonstrated how the failure could happen. Furthermore, with the use of exponential and Weibull
distributions by applying Monte Carlo simulation, the reliability is estimated and the reliability curve
is presented within the 5-year guarantee period for the system analyzed.
2. Power Stage Components
In the wind-fuel cell system as a hybrid energy system application, the power conditioner
subsystem of a PEMFC system carries out the primary power conversion from the input voltage
to the output voltage. Usually, a power stage has three parts: Input filter, power amplifier, and output
filter. MOSFETs are used as an active subcomponent and it are significant and important due to
functions and applications. The power amplifier contained in this case is sixteen MOSFETs used as
switches and rectifier where the electrical current is conducted at the desired time interval. Besides,
two transformers are used to isolate the primary and secondary sides and to store transient energies
during transients.
Furthermore, a voltage dependent resistor (VDR) or varistor is used as control/limit for excessive
transient voltage. Both the input filter and the output filter contain the fuse, choke, shunt resistor, and an
electrolytic capacitor. A shunt resistor functions as a type of current sensor used in the power
stage [13,34]. The schematic of the PEMFC’s different levels and all of the main elements of the power
stage are depicted and identified in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively.
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Figure 1. Simplified schematic of the proton exchange membrane fuel cell (PEMFC) categorized in
different levels.
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3. Failure Mechanisms and Failure Modes Analysis
Each system has internal durability that may be varied due to particular internal or external
circumstances. Failure occurs when exerted stress exceeds the capacity of a system [35]. Failure
mechanisms are physical processes that cause failures or stress that, in turn, reduce the stability
of the system [36]. These mechanisms are different for mechanical and electrical equipment [37].
Mechanical failure mechanisms can generally be divided into three categories: Tension creation,
strength reduction, and stress increase. However, the failure mechanism in electrical equipment
is more complicated than that of mechanical failure mechanism due to the complexity of
electrical assemblies, which can be divided into three general categories of electrical stress
(tension), inherent failure, and external failure. Each of these mechanisms will cause a functional
problem and reduce the reliability [38].
First, electrical tension mechanism: Application of an exceeded voltage or current intensity to
an electrical component leads to stress creation, reduced performance, or degradation. Additionally,
extreme electrical currents increase the heat and local melting at sensitive points of the circuit,
which often result in the catastrophic failure or hidden damages of the circuit [21,39], such as failure
mechanism type of the MOSFETs and the electrolytic capacitors.
Second, inherent failure mechanism: This mechanism is related to the electronic component
itself. These kinds of failure mechanisms are often related to semiconductor components/chips
and the growth of active electrical layers on their surface. In general, the inherent failure mechanisms
include ion contamination, gate oxide breakdown, surface charge spreading, and hot electrons [21,39].
These failures often occur due to weaknesses in the manufacturing process or incomplete print
design techniques.
Third, external failure mechanism: This failure mechanism generally occurs because of external
factors, such as mounting and packaging problems, and the way of connecting with other components
in the unit or system environmental effects [39]. Today, due to the growth of knowledge and technology
in the design and manufacturing of electronic components, external failures are more important
than the inherent failure of the components. Die attachment failure, electron migration, corrosion,
radiation, and internal connection failures are among common failure mechanisms of external failure
in the electronic components.
Applying an exceeded voltage to the MOSFET as a top subcomponent of the power stage in
a circuit is a partial and secondary fault. However, the existence of electrostatics because of high
voltage discharge in this element is a partial and primary fault, leading to local melting and the oxide
gate’s breakdown. Both conditions, i.e., the electrostatic discharge (ESD) and the electrical over stress
(EOS), are included in a subset of failures due to electrical stresses. Because of improper processing
of the oxide gate or mentioned electrical stresses, differences appear in voltage and current characteristics
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of the MOSFET. This defect, comprising an intrinsic failure mechanism and electrical stress, traps
electrons at the common interface of the oxide gate, creating improper electrical fields and energizing
electrons to enter the oxide, resulting in a threshold voltage shift and short circuit. This failure
mechanism steps as an instance on the critical active subcomponent of the power stage as illustrated in
Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Failure mechanism analysis of the metal oxide semiconductor field effect transistor (MOSFET).
FMEA is an important step in the reliability assessment. The design is the primary objective
of the FMEA. Another objective of the FMEA is to identify and classify the potential risk of
components [40]. It can support the fault-tolerant plan, testability, security, logistic patronage,
and pertaining functions for system FMEAs; the aim is to review the design and predict the damage
to the system. Improvements of the test and verification of the plans are other targets of the FMEA [41].
Figure 4 shows the process of an FMEA for the power stage in the PEMFC. This methodology
could be applied in the state-of-the-art of the PEMFC industry in order to overcome shortages
in identifying the critical failure mechanism for each component. Occurrence (O), Detectability
(D), and Severity (S) are used in the FMEA methods as three risk factors. Input parameters of three factors
are scored by a four-point scale to classify different failures, depending on the case study [42]. Based on
Tables 1–3, scale factors start from one to four shown in the ranking, specified for very low to high risk,
respectively. Tables 1–3 show the O, D and S classification respectively [43,44]. Table 4 is the FMEA
table with the top functions, failure modes, failure cause, failure mechanism, and mechanism type,
as well as risk priority number (RPN) as an initial estimation of risk of subcomponents of the power
stage in a PEMFC system [45,46].
By implementation of the FMEA and using the scales for severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection
(D) factors and by multiplying these input factors [44], the highest risk priority percentage for each
subcomponent of the power stage is recognized, which is demonstrated in the Pareto plot of RPN for
each subcomponent for a power stage, as shown in Figure 5. As it can be seen, MOSFET and electrolyte
capacitor are the most effective on reliability and lifetime of the power stage with around 50% risk.
Furthermore, other subcomponents, like transformer and choke, are in the less priority level for risk
analysis; that is why they are not considered in following sections.
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Figure 4. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) process for the power stage in PEMFC.
Table 1. Occurrence (O) rating scale in FMEA analysis.
Ranking Criteria Description
1 Very low Unlikely to occur at all
2 Low Remote—once in 1 to 10 number
3 Medium Rare—once in 10 to 100 number
4 High Occasional—once in 100 to 1000 number
Table 2. Detection (D) rating scale.
Ranking Criteria Description
1 High Detectable with a shutdown
2 Medium Detectable according to the deviation
3 Low Detectable by a sensor
4 Very low Not physically detectable
Table 3. Severity (S) rating scale.
Ranking Criteria Description
1 Very low Negligibl changes like temperature
2 Low Reducti n in a ork
3 Medium Loss of ability to work
4 High Major damage to work
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Table 4. Failure modes, causes, and mechanisms of power stage components.
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4. Fault Tree Analysis
This section is dedicated to introducing failures of the power stage, where the relationship
among their subcomponents is delineated by means of the fault tree. The FTA is a deductive method
based on the assumption of an unacceptable situation or an event contrary to the main purpose
of the system. This unacceptable situation/event is called the “top event”. In the analysis of the fault
tree, it is required to distinguish a component fault from a system fault that results from more than one
component [33,47]. Also, the classification of failures into primary and secondary categories will be
advantageous in the estimation of the fault tree. That means primary failures include occurrence under
normal/tolerable (designed) system conditions, while secondary failures occur in a component and in
a state that the system is not designed, and they are usually caused by inappropriate external
conditions [48]. The fault tree of the power stage is shown in Figure 6.Electronics 2019, 8, 1412 9 of 14 
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where, β is the shape parameter, and the scale parameter is ï. The shape parameter is also known
as the Weibull slope [49,50]. It should be mentioned that by considering β equals 1 in the Weibull
distribution, it would be exactly an exponential distribution, which can show the useful life part
of the bathtub curve throughout the product lifecycle failure rate, Equation (3).
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Table 5. Failure rate and Weibull parameters.







Fuse 0.02 × 10−6 1 5.00 × 107
Electrolytic capacitor 0.11 × 10−6 1 8.33 × 106
Choke 0.16 × 10−9 1 5.95 × 109
Shunt resistor 0.43 × 10−9 1 2.31 × 109
MOSFET 0.58 × 10−6 1 1.91 × 106
VDR 0.43 × 10−9 1 2.31 × 109
Transformer 0.15 × 10−6 1 6.51 × 106
Heatsink 0.06 × 10−6 1 1.66 × 107
5. Results and Discussion of Reliability Analysis
The reliability curve in Figure 7 shows the system reliability along with time when the reliability
is the probability of the system not failed by time. The reliability is calculated by implementing Monte
Carlo simulation with point results every 100 h with start time 1 h and end time five years for 1000
number of simulations of the system using the ReliaSoft BlockSim software package. The reliability
curve of the power stage, along with the operating years, is illustrated in Figure 6. It is noted
that the B1 lifetime is estimated at 21,300 h (887.5 days) in the case of a shape parameter one (β = 1)
for all of components shown in Table 2, which is illustrated with the blue color. However, reliability
curve with the red color shows B1 at 40,900 h (1704 days) because it has different shape parameters
estimated just for MOSFET and electrolytic capacitor; their shape parameter values are taken from [7],
2.59 and 1.93, respectively. Hence, scaling parameters are estimated 1.61 × 106 for the MOSFET and 2.18
× 106 for the electrolytic capacitor. In fact, this figure clearly illustrates more realization in comparison
with not considering Weibull distribution for reliability analysis. In other words, the obtained reliability
curve of the system from the Weibull data is very close to the reality experienced in the system.
Consequently, failure analysis shows that two subcomponents of the power stage, which contains
MOSFET as an active component and electrolytic capacitor as a passive component, have the most
effect on the changes of the reliability as well as the critical failure and hidden damages to the circuit
of the system as discussed and demonstrated before in the Pareto plot (Figure 5) from risk analysis
of each subcomponent of the power stage based on the FMEA technique. By inserting the Weibull
parameter (blue curve) for these two components in the reliability analysis, the results are more
reasonable rather than exponential distribution (red one).
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Figure 7. Reliability curve of power stage along with the operating hours (blue, Weibull distribution;
red, exponential distribution).
The results of the proposed methodology are comparable and complementary with the results of
other methodologies. For example, considering the critical power electronic components, the annual
accumulated damage is estimated, due to the real mission profile of the fuel cell system. Then, the Monte
Carlo analysis is applied to obtain the Weibull distribution of the power semiconductors lifetime.
The presented reliability estimation and findings using FMEA and FTA by assuming Weibull
distributions have their pros and cons. For instance, it is more detailed, focusing on subcomponents,
components, and system; on the other hand it is more understandable, simple, easy, and faster.
6. Conclusions
This paper has presented a failure mechanism analysis of the power stage components in a hybrid
wind-fuel cell system by using the FMEA and the FTA. The FMEA identified and analyzed the failure
mechanism of power stage components for selected critical subcomponents, which their failures may
have significant effects on the system reliability. Some of the failure modes of an active subcomponent
such as MOSFET are switching losses, conduction losses, improper pieces selection, failure to operate
as designed, voltage and current fluctuations, fractured, overloading, shock failure, and contact
damage. Moreover, some of the failure modes of passive subcomponent like electrolyte capacitors
are: Non-amplification, improper pieces selection, failure to function as intended for any piece,
voltage, and current fluctuations, breakage, electric current, improper assembly, inadequate support
(structural), fractured, loosened, open-circuited, overloading, oxidized, shock failure, short-circuited,
contact damage, swells, thinning, distortion, and vibration. Furthermore, the FTA is constructed by
considering the results of the FMEA with three significant parts: Input filter, power amplifier, and output
filter. The reliability curve of the power stage can be estimated in five years, which is consistent
with the defined guarantee period. It is concluded that the B1 lifetime of the power stage is
2.4 years for the same shape parameter (assumed exponential distribution) and 4.7 years for
different shape parameters (assumed Weibull distribution), which is closer to real experience. It is
recommended to use Weibull distribution for reliability analysis rather than exponential distribution
as it leads to more realistic results. Since the Weibull parameters are not usually available for all
components or difficult to obtain by reliability tests, FMEA is recommended to distinguish the high-risk
components and consequently to find their Weibull parameters for reliability analysis.
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Abstract: This paper uses a system engineering approach based on the Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis (FMEA) methodology to do risk analysis of the power conditioner of a Proton Exchange
Membrane Fuel Cell (PEMFC). Critical components with high risk, common cause failures and effects
are identified for the power conditioner system as one of the crucial parts of the PEMFCs used for
backup power applications in the telecommunication industry. The results of this paper indicate
that the highest risk corresponds to three failure modes including high leakage current due to the
substrate interface of the metal oxide semiconductor field effect transistor (MOSFET), current and
electrolytic evaporation of capacitor, and thereby short circuit, loss of gate control, and increased
leakage current due to gate oxide of the MOSFET. The MOSFETs, capacitors, chokes, and transformers
are critical components of the power stage, which should be carefully considered in the development
of the design production and implementation stage. Finally, Bayesian networks (BNs) are used to
identify the most critical failure causes in the MOSFET and capacitor as they are classified from the
FMEA as key items based on their Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs). As a result of BNs analyses, high
temperature and overvoltage are distinguished as the most crucial failure causes. Consequently, it is
recommended for designers to pay more attention to the design of MOSFETs’ failure due to high
leakage current owing to substrate interface, which is caused by high temperature. The results are
emphasizing design improvement in the material in order to be more resistant from high temperature.
Keywords: bayesian network; failure mode and effect analysis; proton exchange membrane fuel cell;
power conditioner; risk analysis
1. Introduction
Global climate changes caused by conventional energy resources such as fossil fuels are one
of the dominant motivations that engineers are trying to employ renewable energies. Also, fossil
fuel resources are limited, and they will eventually be depleted with the rapid growth of energy
consumption. The environmental damages in the world caused by non-renewable energies ends up
to be approximately five trillion dollars per year [1]. Renewable energies, such as wind turbines,
solar cells and fuel cell systems are proposed as solutions to solve these global problems. A fuel
cell works as a source generating energy along with unique properties, which are being developed
rapidly. In the global sustainable development perspective, fuel cells are suitable as they provide high
energy conversion efficiency, various usages being a compact and environmental friendliness system.
These are the foremost reason that fuel cell systems are used in energy systems; that is why they are
Sustainability 2020, 12, 77; doi:10.3390/su12010077 www.mdpi.com/journal/sustainability
-60-
Sustainability 2020, 12, 77 2 of 18
considered as one of the main sources of energy. The first fuel cell was demonstrated by a Welsh
scientist and barrister William Grove in 1839. One type of fuel cells was improved by General Electric
in the beginning of 1960s [2] which was the Proton-Exchange Membrane Fuel Cells (PEMFC) which are
a kind of fuel cells, which are being developed mainly for transportation and portable applications and
even in hybrid energy systems such as wind-fuel cell systems. High energy efficiency, less pollution,
and high reliability are significant properties of the PEMFC systems [3]. The telecommunication
industry has applied fuel cell systems for backup power [4]. Under this circumstance, availability and
reliability, as well as risk, are important issues, which should be assessed carefully for them. PEMFC
technology has been developed to overcome the instability and environmental concerns compared
with conventional energy sources since the 1990s. Fuel cells are relatively expensive, having a higher
cost, one ought to identify the high risk components to spend more money on their design to minimize
the cost of failures. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), an organized technique for failure
analysis, is applied to identify critical failure modes, failure causes, and effects of the items of interest,
which can be applied for power electronics.
The risk is a measure of the potential expected loss occurring due to natural or non-natural
activities [5]. Risk analysis has two facets: Quantitative and qualitative. In order to assess probabilities
to make decisions, the quantitative risk analysis endeavor to estimate the risk in the form of probability
(frequency) of a loss. Quantitative risk analysis is frequently a preferred approach when adequate
field data, test data, and other evidence are available to estimate the likelihood and magnitude of the
losses [6–9]. Qualitative risk analysis is the most widely used since it is quick and straightforward to
perform. For this type, the potential loss is qualitatively estimated using linguistic scales such as low,
medium, and high. Since this type of analysis barely needs to rely on actual data and its probabilistic
treatment, the analysis is much simpler and easier to use and understand; however, it may be rather
subjective [10].
FMEA is a structured and logical methodology for identifying, analyzing and ranking estimated
risk having various potential failure modes. Furthermore, it is suggested to improve the methodology;
for instance, changes in the design or control tests, which can assist engineers to prevent the failure or
reduce its effects [11]. FMEA is a vital reliability tool to identify critical failure modes, failure causes,
and failure mechanisms that can be used to diagnose probable failure and dissatisfactions of functions
for any items in a system before they occur, aiming to reduce their risks [12].
The FMEA method is based on discovering, arranging, and decreasing the failures or faults;
moreover, it has been used in multiple kinds of industry [13]. For instance, FMEA can be used
for energy production systems such as wind turbines consisting of a complex system of electrical,
mechanical and structural components [14]. Three risk factors, including Occurrence (O), Detectability
(D), and Severity (S) are used in the FMEA. O designates the rate of the risks, D point to the likelihood
of risks prediction earlier than their occurrence, and S is the significance of the risk to the system. The
yield factor indicated as the Risk Priority Number (RPN) is the creation of the three input parameters
grade the failure state which are scored by a 10-point scale. As a matter of fact, RPN is a quantitative
and qualitative risk analysis in the form of numerical ranking of risk of each potential failure mode. It
is constitued of the product of the three qualitative factors, S of the effect, likelihood of O of the cause,
and likelihood of D of the cause in the robustness method [15]. Many standards are used to classify
different faults, which occur in the PEMFC. In this paper, scales are extracted from the Automotive
Industry Action Group (AIAG). Afterwards, by multiplying these input factors, their corresponding
RPNs are recognized [16].
The reliability and availability of the PEMFC system, especially power conditioner, are vital in the
condition of power grid outage used in the telecommunication stations backup power. Owing to that
factor, risk assessment and failure effect analysis of the critical components are mandatory. There are
several research studies available, which perform the FMEA for fuel cell systems with the emphasis on
the fuel cell stack [17]. However, the means to implement the FMEA is not given or provided; thus, it is
not given how this procedure is implemented by using either brain-storming or a system engineering
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approach. In this paper, two aspects are combined to fulfill the gap in the existing literature. First,
instead of focusing on the fuel cell stack, the power conditioner is comprehensively investigated, which
are studied in terms of the critical power electronics components. Second, the FMEA is implemented
based on system engineering approach having the given detailed implementation procedure.
Furthermore, Bayesian Network (BN) is utilized to analyze the most critical failure causes
among more important items identified from FMEA. BN is a graphical model that containing nodes,
symbolizing variables, and directed links between them standing for casual relationships. The
relationships between variables are as if X causes Y, X is a parent of Y, and Y is a child of X. The
probabilities are given as conditional probability distributions for each node, depending on the parents.
When evidence is received for a node, the joint distribution can be updated using Bayes rule, and
posterior marginal distributions can be found [18]. This will help designers to pay more attention on
the development of the design for instance, material properties to avoid failures from obtained results
by this method. For example, anion-deficient perovskites, as materials with high ionic conductivity
and a wide range of temperature stability, are very suitable for fuel cell membranes [19]. Moreover,
magneto dielectrics such as hexaferrites: are the materials that are promising for the production
of capacitors, which are very necessary for their stable operation [20]. For the stable and steady
operation of modern power plants and uninterruptible power systems, it is necessary to provide for
their protection against unwanted external electromagnetic radiation. Such an electromagnetic effect
can easily cause the collapse of the entire modern energy system. To prevent this, electromagnetic
shields must be used [21,22].
To sum up, by using the FMEA for the PEMFC system, potential failure modes and risk of
components are identified, and critical components are also classified. Furthermore, the potential
of the risk priority number is assigned to any failure. The FMEA results offer which component is
critical to have high RPNs. Moreover, some recommended solutions are suggested to create better
conditions to reduce their risk. Therefore, damage to the entire system due to failure modes and causes
is decreased. Finally, by implementing BN the impact of each failure cause is studied, to find which
failure causes have the most effects among other failure causes in the MOSFET.
2. Description of PEMFC and Power Conditioner
2.1. PEMFC System
A PEMFC is an electrochemical system, which changes the chemical energy through the reaction
of hydrogen and oxygen to electrical power. There are a variety of PEMFC applications such as mobile
power generation systems and stations, automotive, aerospace and marine industries [23].
A typical configuration of the PEMFC system is shown in Figure 1, which consists of the Balance of
Plant (BoP), the PEMFC stack, and the power conditioner. [7,8]. The BoP is a monitoring system having
auxiliary parts, which serve to regulate the supply and balance hydrogen, air, water and thermal
condition for the PEMFC stack. The PEMFC stack is an assembly of several single cells (output less
than 1 V), bipolar plates, cooling plates, end plates, bolts, and gaskets, which converts the chemical
energy into the electricity [23]. A power conditioner is composed of active and passive electrical
components, enabling to regulate the fixed output from the PEMFC stack [24].
2.2. Power Conditioner Sub-System
This section presents the detailed configuration of the power conditioner sub-system for a PEMFC
system in a backup power application. The block diagram of the power conditioner sub-system having
1 kW output power is shown in Figure 2, where five parts, are included which are the power stage,
auxiliary power supply, gate driver, controller, and PCB, which can be further sub-divided [25]. The
power stage consists of an isolated DC/DC converter. This part contains plenty of components (such as
MOSFETs, capacitors, inductors, transformer, and other related components). The input voltage range
is 30–65 V, while the output voltage is 48 V. As a result, a power converter that can work both in step-up
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and step-down modes is preferred. Moreover, the isolation from primary-side and secondary-side is
required according to the industry standard. Some of the functions of the subsystems are switching
the electrical current at the desired time interval, rectifying current in the desired time interval and
control, regulating and rectifying the electrical current and voltage level change.
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In the power stage, eight primary and eight secondary MOSFETs are used as active switches
having the function to control the electrical current in the system. Also, eight primaries and eight
secondary diodes are applied in the converter. Moreover, two transformers are used to provide
isolation between primary and secondary side. Besides, here are eight electrolytic capacitors having a
capacity of 680 µF and 63 V in the primary and six electrolytic capacitors having the capacity of 390 µF
and 100 V in the secondary side as a storage for the electrical energy and stabilization of the dc voltage.
The overall objective of the power conditioner is that in the case of a step-up mode, the primary-side
inductor is charged by the activation of all transistors; while it is discharged by the parallel connection
of the two transformers. Alternatively, in the case of the step-down mode, the primary-side inductor is
charged by the parallel connection of the transformers, while it is discharged by the series connection of
the transformers [26]. The structure of the power converter used in this study is presented in Figure 3.
Due to the variable output voltage of the fuel cell stack, a dc/dc power converter is required to match
the voltage in telecom applications. A topology using galvanic isolation is shown in Figure 3, where
-63-
Sustainability 2020, 12, 77 5 of 18
the rated power of the converter is 1 kW, and six 1 kW converters are connected in parallel for a 5 kW
power stage to obtain the redundancy. Moreover, a synchronous rectification is adopted to achieve
low conduction losses in the situation of low-voltage and high-current at the secondary-side of the
transformer [26]. All the components in the power conditioner can be categorized of four levels of the
PEMFC system as it is demonstrated in Figure 4.
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3. System Engineering Approach Based FMEA of Power Conditioner
3.1. Boundary Diagram and FMEA Interface Matrix
In order to make a visible scope of the FMEA analysis, an FMEA block diagram (FMEA boundary
diagram) is used to visualize the interfaces between the various sub-systems and components. The
boundary diagram shows the physical and logical relationships among the main sub-systems of the
PEMFC system, such as physical connection, material exchange, energy transfer, and data exchange.
Besides, their inputs and outputs are also identified [3] (Figures 1 and 2 illustrate an overview of
boundary diagram for the PEMFC system and the power conditioner sub-system). Moreover, the
FMEA interface matrix is a chart on the vertical and horizontal axes interfaces, which ought to be
considered in the examination of this kind of interface. As aforementioned, the physical connection,
material exchange, energy transfer, and data exchange are four primary types of interfaces. Up to
50% or more of the total failures are normally seem in the interfaces. As a result, it is important that
any FMEA considerately study the interfaces between the sub-systems and components besides their
content. On top of the FMEA boundary diagram, as a complementary to it, the FMEA interface matrix
is presented. The FMEA interface matrix for the PEMFC system is listed in Table 1 in connection with
Figure 1; and the FMEA interface matrix for the power conditioner is listed in Table 2 and is related to
Figure 2.
Table 1. FMEA interface matrix for three main systems of PEMFC.
PEMFC Balance of Plant PEMFC Stack Power Conditioner
Balance of plant PMED1
PEMFC stack PMED1 PE1
Power conditioner PE1
Interface Type: Physical (P), Material Exchange (M), Energy Transfer (E), Data Exchange (D); Functional Necessity:
Must be present (1), Must not be present (2).
Table 2. FMEA interface matrix for the power conditioner.
Power Conditioner Auxiliary PowerSupply Power Stage Controller Gate Driver PCB
Auxiliary Power Supply PED1 PD1 PED1 P1
Power Stage PED1 PED1 P1
Controller PD1 PD1 P1
Gate Driver PED1 PED1 PD1 P1
PCB P1 P1 P1 P1
3.2. Function Block Diagram and Parameter Diagram
Another visual tool to describe the operation, interrelationships and interdependencies of the
system functions is Function Block Diagram (FBD). Moreover, the Parameter diagram (P-diagram) is a
functional tool to document input signals, noise factors, control factors, error states, and ideal response.
It is more practical once the item under analysis is a complicated system where it is a time-consuming
analysis; however, it can provide significant value in comprehending and controlling the system and
recognizing the input to the FMEA techniques. Any of these tools are used for better detection of the
FMEA of the four levels of classifications of the PEMFC system [27]. FBD of the PEMFC system is
shown in Figure 5. Furthermore, the P–Diagram (PD) of the PEMFC is illustrated in Figure 6, which
takes the inputs from a system and link those inputs to the desired outputs. In addition, it considers
non-controllable influences from outside.
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3.3. Relationship of Functions and Failure Modes
As mentioned before, it is important that a FMEA precisely investigates the connective links
among the sub-systems and components as well as their content. As shown in Figure 7, four levels
of the PEMFC system are used to describe the power stage, which contains four critical components:
MOSFETs, electrolytic capacitors, transformers and inductors (chokes). Generally, any failure mode is
a failure cause for the power stage (Level 3). Similarly, failure modes of the power stage (Level 3) are
failure causes of the power conditioner (Level 4). Figure 7 demonstrates the hierarchical impact of
the failure of the PEMFC and interfaces among system, sub-system, and principal components. Two
primary functions (F) and failure modes (FM) of the power conditioner and their relations with three
levels are shown in Figures 8 and 9.
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3.4. FMEA Results
In this paper, a new estimation of the PEMFC system using FMEA is presented by focusing on
power electronics components in the power conditioner. The analysis investigates numerous potential
failure modes according to the API 580 (American Petroleum Institute), JEDEC (Joint Electron Device
Engineering Council), NDI (Non-Destructive Inspection), and normal cause and failure for the industry
affections. Specifically, parts of each level may have some failure modes and many failure causes. The
failure modes of each level, in fact, are failure causes of the higher level. In the power conditioner, the
power stage is identified as the most critical subsystem, and four critical components have the highest
risk of failure and damage. Fu thermore, the highest RPN is fo the MOSFETs and capacitors are
respectively having a result of 448, 392 with the failure mode of ‘high leakage current due to substrate
interface’ and ‘electrolyte evaporation’. High leakage curr nt failure mode havin two main causes,
‘high current density’ a d ‘over-voltage’ has the highest risk number for the MOSFETs. Moreover,
electrolytic evaporation by the deterioration of sealant material leads to insufficient sealing for the
capacitors having the highest risk number in passive components. The FMEA of all the components
and calculated RPNs for the power stage are illustrated in Table 3.
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Table 3. FMEA table for critical sub-components of the power stage.
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According to Table 3, the highest RPNs are seen and depicted clearly in Figure 10. Furthermore, by
analyzing the output of the FMEA, the top failure modes are distinguished depending on the severity,
concurrency, and detection rate. It is valuable to point out that the uppermost of risk priorities of
failure modes requiring the severity parameter as well as occurrence rate refers to the short circuit in
each of the four main components having an overstressed mechanism. Moreover, all leakages in the
components such as leakage current in MOSFETs, electrolyte evaporation in capacitors and leakage
inductance in inductors as well as transformers have the highest risk priorities of failure modes. This
issue should be considered in order to reduce the risk by improving the design.Sustainability 2020, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 18 
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4. Risk Analysis
Risk analysis is one of the most rational methods to identify failure modes in fuel cell systems.
The risk analysis using FMEA is an approach to prioritiz the potential risk according to the failure
causes [28]. In this risk analysis, the MOSFET having four main failure modes, and at least two causes
for each one and average RPN = 303 in the power stage have the highest risk. Additionally, the
capacitor item having four main failure modes and more than ten causes and average RPN = 274 is
more critical comp red to the inductor item having four main failure modes and six different causes
and average RPN = 176. Finally, the transformer having four main failure modes, and six main causes
has an average of RPN = 163.
Figure 10 illustrates three areas of critically failure modes for the crucial components of the power
stage. The black color is considered for above 300 RPNs, and below 150 RPNs are colored with white.
Most failure modes are in the medium range of risk, and they are shown with gray color. Extensive
simulation studies, preventive control, use of diagnostic methods, predictive deployment technologies,
employing visual management techniques, using sensors to distinguish failures, using preventive
maintenance and developing inspection methods to identify hidden failures in the redundant items
are among the recommended implementations for any of the components in the PEMFC system.
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5. Bayesian Network
In a Bayesian analysis, the probability P(A) of the event A is formulated as a degree of belief that
A will occur [29].






where P(A) is a prior estimate, P(B|A) is a likelihood of A given B, and P(B) is the marginal probability
of B [30].
In order to build a BN based on the available FMEA, following BN is suggested:
In Figure 11, it is shown in an illustrative way how BN is built from the FMEA (Table 3) [31].
Finally, by merging common nodes, the BN for MOSFET is created as shown in Figure 12. The reason
to choose the MOSFET is because of the results obtained from RPN. As shown in Figure 10, the first
failure mode has the most significant influence on the system. The aim is to find, which failure cause
has the most impact. Hugin as a tool is used for building the BN. It is considered that each node has
two states, true and false.
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The process of making the BN is as follows:
1. BN is built based on Figure 11. from the FMEA in Table 3;
2. Joint failure modes and causes are merged;
3. For all failure causes two states are defined with equal probability of failure for their states: false
and true;
4. Conditional probability tables (CPTs) are built. The maximum entropy theory is used to specify
each probability of failure. Figure 13 shows two examples of conditional probability tables (CPTs).
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Effect of each failure cause to MOSFET is calculated by the proposed BN. Table 4 compares failure
causes in the MOSFET.
Table 4. Comparison of failure causes in the MOSFET.
Failure Cause MOSFET Probability of Failure (%)
High Temperature 82.97
Over Voltage 79.78
High Current Density 77.00
High Electric Field 73.93
Ionizing Radiation 68.67
Comparing all failure causes effects on MOSFET failure shows that high temperature and
overvoltage are the most important failure causes in MOSFET.
6. Conclusions
This study proposes a system engineering approach using FMEA for the risk analysis of the
power conditioner in a PEMFC system. The highest RPNs correspond to the failure modes in three
components, including high leakage current due to the substrate interface of the MOSFET, current
and electrolytic evaporation of capacitor, and thereby short circuit, loss of gate control, and increased
leakage current due to gate oxide of the MOSFET. Electronic components have a wide range of failure
modes. The MOSFETs, capacitors, chokes, and transformers are the critical components of the power
stage, which should be carefully considered in the development and implementation stage. In general,
short circuit, open circuit, and leakage current are considered as the most important failure modes in
the power supply system. Consequently, using a comprehensive FMEA analysis especially by using an
extensive P-diagram, failure analysis, and its effects is studied in order to have a better understanding
of the system in comparison with the available literature. Finally, BN is used to analyze the most critical
failure causes among more important items identified from the FMEA, MOSFET and capacitor. The
reason to use BN is that it was difficult to find RPNs of each failure cause, so the BN is implemented
by two states of true and false or in other words failure and success to find the most critical failure
cause. High temperature and overvoltage are ascertained utilizing BN. Knowing this fact will help
designers to pay more attention on material properties to avoid failure causing by high temperature
and overvoltage.
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A B S T R A C T
Proton exchange membrane fuel cell recently emerges in the telecom backup power, where its reliability and
availability issues are with high priority. In this paper, as one of the fragile sub-systems, the reliable performance
of the power conditioner, including the power stage, the controller, the gate driver, the auxiliary the power
supply and the printed circuit board, is the key focus. According to the configuration and main functions of the
aforementioned key components, the fault tree structure of power conditioner can be established. With the help
of the Weibull distribution, the random failure mode and wear-out failure mode impacts on the reliability can be
estimated. Moreover, the reliability and availability curves can be studied by considering the maintenance
scheme. In this case study, it can be seen that the wear-out issue is more worthy to be taken care compared to the
random failure. Moreover, the regular maintenance with the key components significantly increases the relia-
bility and availability performance of the power conditioner.
1. Introduction
Recently, renewable energy generation is rapidly growing in the
power sector. One of them is the fuel cells, which are becoming more
promising for various kinds of applications [1]. The first fuel cell was
prototyped by a British scientist in 1839 [2]; in the 1990s, proof-of-
concept fuel cells followed, and sub-scale and full-scale prototype sys-
tems were developed to demonstrate the technology [3]. Proton Ex-
change Membrane Fuel Cells (PEMFCs) are one of the promising types,
as they can be used in multiple applications. The PEMFCs transform the
chemical energy into electrical power via the electrochemical reaction
[4]. From the sustainable development perspective, the PEMFCs are
more suitable and competitive in comparison with other renewable
energy systems, as the fuel cell contributes on high energy conversion
efficiency, a more compact design and environmentally friendly [5]. In
addition, as budgets in any project are limited in both the design and
operational stages, it is reasonable to invest in critical components in
order to increase the reliability of the system. Since fuel cell systems are
used for reliability or safety critical occasions such as backup power for
the emergency, their reliable operation is vital. For the aforementioned
reason, it is required to pay more attention to their reliability and
availability.
Reliability assessment is frequently a crucial and mandatory step in
designing and analyzing systems [6]. An important characteristic of
engineering systems is that they behave dynamically, i.e., their re-
sponse to an initial perturbation evolves as system components interact
with one another as well as with the environment [7]. In addition,
different maintenance strategies could have different impacts on relia-
bility and availability; while maximal reliability and availability or
minimal costs in a system could be achieved when these strategies are
optimized [8].
In this paper, the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), as a conventional
method for reliability assessment [9, 10] is designed to illustrate the
relations between basic event logical variables and significant compo-
nents. One of the principal aspects that could affect system reliability is
aging. Considering aging effects in the calculations by choosing an
appropriate reliability distribution is an important issue. At last, by
applying Monte Carlo simulation and considering maintenance and
inspection policy, the availability is calculated for five years of the
system operation.
2. System configuration and reliability assessment method
2.1. Critical components of power conditioner
The power conditioner is one of the main sub-systems in the PEMFC
system, which consists of five components: the power stage, the aux-
iliary power supply, the gate driver, the controller and the Printed
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Circuit Board (PCB) [11]. Fig. 1 illustrates the configuration of the
power conditioner.
All components of the power conditioner and their key sub-com-
ponents are shown in Fig. 2. Concisely, the main functions of compo-
nents in the power conditioner are listed as follows [12]:
1. The power stage mainly consists of the isolated DC/DC converter,
which performs the basic power conversion from wide range of the
input voltage (+30–65 Vdc) to fixed output voltage (+48 Vdc).
2. The controller makes it possible to operate the converter in either
boost mode or buck mode, depending on the fuel cell output voltage.
In addition, the output of the controller is the drive signal of the
power devices, which is further sent to the gate driver.
3. The gate driver aims to amplify the drive signals from the micro-
processor in order to actively control the power switches on and off.
4. The function of the auxiliary power supply is to power on all of the
Integrated Circuits (ICs) used in the controller and gate driver.
5. As shown in Fig. 1, all of the key sub-components are accom-
modated in the PCB. In addition, the connectors are used to link the
input power and output load.
2.2. Fault tree analysis
The fault tree approach is a deductive process by means of which an
undesirable event (top event) is postulated, and the possible ways for
this event to occur are systematically deduced [6]. The deduction
process is performed so that the fault tree embodies all component
failures (i.e., failure modes) that contribute to the occurrence of the top
event. The fault tree itself is a graphical representation of the various
combinations of failures that lead to the occurrence of the top event
[13].
The postulated fault events that appear on the fault tree may not be
exhaustive. Only those events considered important can be included.
However, it should be noted that the decision for inclusion in failure
events is not arbitrary. Besides, it is affected by the fault tree con-
struction procedure, system design and operation, operating history,
available failure data, and experience of the analyst. At each inter-
mediate point, the postulated events represent the immediate, neces-
sary, and sufficient causes for the occurrence of the intermediate (or
top) events [6]. Based on the key sub-components as shown in Fig. 2
and the operation principle of the power conditioner, the fault tree
structure of this case study can be developed and established. As shown
in Fig. 3, the relationship between the sub-system of the power condi-
tioner and the five components, as well as the corresponding compo-
nent and its sub-components are described in detail.
3. Random and wear-out failure modes
3.1. Basic concepts
The bathtub curve describes a general form of the failure rate
through the life cycle of the product, which basically includes three
regions as shown in Fig. 4 [14, 15]:
1. Decreasing failure rate, known as early failures.
2. Constant failure rate, known as random failures.
3. Increasing failure rate, known as wear-out failures.
In region one, the initial failure rate is high but decreases rapidly as
defective components are identified and discarded. In region two, the
failure rate is generally low and constant, which can be expressed by
the exponential distribution. The exponential distribution is the prob-
ability distribution referring to a process, in which events occur con-
tinuously and independently at a constant mean rate. In region three,
the failure rate increases due to [the] aging and wear out effects, which
can be analyzed in reliability engineering by using the Weibull dis-
tribution.
The Weibull distribution is a probability distribution, which can
generally be determined by the shape parameter β and the scale para-
meter η. The shape parameter is also known as the Weibull slope [6]. If
β is equal or less than one, it approximately becomes exponential dis-
tribution, and η expresses the mean value [6]. If β is more than one, the
Fig. 1. The configuration of the power conditioner.
Fig. 2. All components and sub-components of the power conditioner.
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probability density function generally has a maximum value. This shape
factor is used to represent the aging effect on components by increasing
failure rates. Table 1 summarizes the relationship between the shape
parameter and the corresponding failure rate [16]. It is worth men-
tioning that the exponential distribution is a particular case of the
Weibull distribution.
Due to the lack of a reliability model at the stage of the early fail-
ures, only the constant failure and wear-out failure stages are con-
sidered in the following. With respect to the random failure stage, the
failure rate can be obtained from MIL-HDBK-217F. In addition, if β=1,
the relationship between the scale parameter and failure rate λ can be
found,














with respect to the wear-out failure stage, assuming that the shape
parameter equals two, the scale factor can be calculated by using the
goodness of fit testing method. With the information of the scale factor
Fig. 3. Fault tree simulations of the power conditioner. (a) Sub-system of the power conditioner. (b) Components of the power stage. (c) Components of the auxiliary
power supply. (d) Components of the gate driver. (e) Components of the controller. (f) Components of the printed circuit board.
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and the shape factor. Reliability curve can be deduced as follow:
= −( )R t e( ) tɳ
β
(2)
Considering both the random failure ad wear-out failure, Table 2
lists 5 main components and 33 sub-components with the failure rate
and Weibull parameters in the entire power conditioner.
3.2. Reliability comparison between random and wear-out failure
After performing the FTA and assigning parameters of Weibull
distribution to the power conditioner, the reliability curve of 5 main
components can be calculated within 43,800 h (5 years), where 1000
times of Monte Carlo simulation is used. As shown in Figs. 5 and 6, it is
noted that the random failure mode and the wear-out failure mode are
represented by the exponential distribution (β=1) and Weibull
Fig. 4. Bathtub curve failure rate at three important regions.
Table 1
Shape parameter in Weibull distribution.
β=1 Exponential distribution
β < 1 Decreasing Failure Rate (DFR)
β > 1 Increasing Failure Rate (IFR)
β=3.5 Normal Distribution
Table 2
Weibull parameters for all the sub-components in the cases of random failure and wear-out failure.
Sub-system of PEMFC Components Sub-components Failure rate (λ) Weibull parameters
Scaling parameter (ɳ) with β=1 Scaling parameter (ɳ) with β=2
Power conditioner Power stage Fuse 0.02E-6 5E7 5.64E7
Electrolytic capacitor 0.12E-6 8.33E6 9.4E6
Transformer 0.15E-8 6.66E8 7.52E8
Choke 0.16E-9 6.25E9 7.05E9
Power MOSFET 0.52E-6 1.92E6 2.17E6
Shunt resistor 0.43E-9 2.32E9 2.62E9
VDR 0.43E-9 2.32E9 2.62E9
SMD capacitor 0.69E-9 1.45E9 1.63E9
Heatsink 0.06E-6 1.66E7 1.88E7
Auxiliary power supply MOSFET 0.52E-6 1.92E6 2.17E6
Electrolytic capacitor 0.12E-6 8.33E6 9.4E6
Driver IC 0.38E-8 2.63E8 2.97E8
Isolation transformer 0.15E-6 6.66E6 7.52E6
SMD capacitor 0.69E-9 1.45E9 1.63E9
SMD transistors 0.44E-5 2.27E5 2.56E5
SMD diodes 0.02E-6 5E7 5.64E7
SMD resistors 0.39E-9 2.56E9 2.89E9
Controller DSP 0.12E-6 8.33E6 9.41E6
CPLD 0.32E-8 3.12E8 3.53E8
Crystal 0.11E-6 9.09E6 1.03E7
Miscellaneous ICs 0.38E-8 2.63E8 2.97E8
SMD transistors 0.44E-5 2.27E5 2.57E5
SMD diodes 0.02E-6 5E7 5.64E7
SMD photo-couplers 0.16E-6 6.25E6 7.05E6
Gate driver Driver IC 0.38E-8 2.63E8 2.97E8
Driver transformer 0.15E-6 6.66E6 7.05E6
Miscellaneous ICs 0.38E-8 2.63E8 2.97E8
SMD capacitors 0.69E-9 1.45E9 1.63E9
SMD transistors 0.44E-5 2.27E5 2.56E5
SMD diodes 0.02E-6 5E7 5.64E7
SMD resistors 0.39E-9 2.56E9 2.89E9
PCB PCB board 0.18E-5 5.55E5 6.27E5
Connectors 0.38E-6 2.63E6 2.97E6
Fig. 5. Reliability comparison of five main components in the case of the
random failure.




In fact, these figures are the comparison between the random and
wear-out behavior of the power conditioner sub-system. The top three
reliability-critical components are the gate driver, the auxiliary power
supply, and the controller, respectively. Moreover, it is evident that the
wear-out failure mode is more significant than the random failure. The
designed 5-year operation causes the damage< 1% for the random
failure, while it leads to the damage much>10% in the case of wear-
out failure. In other words, proper maintenance needs to be applied in
order to guarantee the lifetime demand.
4. Reliability, maintainability, and availability
4.1. Concept of maintenance
Maintenance is the ability to maintain or restore a system in func-
tioning state, which contains inspections and repairs. In this paper, it
involves the repair and inspection conditions in 9 critical sub-compo-
nents among 33 basic sub-components of all system. These components,
including transistors, capacitors, transformers, diodes, DSP, CPLD,
crystal, and PCB, are identified through the sensitivity analysis.
Maintenance can affect the maintainability directly by shortening the
time spent on the repair (Mean Time To Repair MTTR). With the de-
creasing MTTR and increasing the average time interval between re-
pairs (Mean Time Between Failure MTBF) at the optimum point, the










Since the repair or inspection time can be changed according to
different conditions, a normal distribution with standard deviation 10%
is modeled with the mean of 720 h and standard deviation of 72 h.
Fig. 7 demonstrates the comparison of the reliability curve in the power
conditioner without repair and with inspection and repair every 720 h
in five years. By assuming a Weibull distribution and the wear-out of
the system, it is noted 1% increase in reliability within the 5-year op-
eration.
4.2. Availability curve
Reliability curve calculated the probability that the system is in an
available state, without ever having entered an unavailable state, at a
certain point in time. Availability curve is the probability that a system
(or component) is operational at any random time. This is very similar
to the reliability function, which gives a probability that a system can
function at the given time. Unlike the reliability, the instantaneous
availability measure incorporates maintainability information. At any
given time, the system is operational with the following conditions:
1. It functions properly during time with probability R(t), or,
2. It functions properly since the last repair at time u, 0 < u < t,
with probability:
∫ −R t u m u du( ) ( )
t
0 (4)
With m(u) being the renewal density function of the system. The
point of availability is the summation of these two probabilities, or:
∫= + −A t R t R t u m u du( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
t
0 (5)
Fig. 8 shows availability curve of power conditioner, which con-
sidering effects of maintenance on the availability of the system for a 5-






Fig. 7. Reliability of power conditioner without repair and inspection (blue)
and with repair and inspection (green) considering Weibull distribution. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is





Fig. 8. Availability of power conditioner without maintenance (black) and with
maintenance (green). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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year period. It can be seen that the availability of the system sig-
nificantly increases by using maintenance scheme.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, the reliability and availability issues of power condi-
tioner system in the PEM fuel cell is studied according to the relation-
ship among all key components. With the help of fault tree analysis, the
reliability of the power conditioner is calculated within 5 years.
Random failure and wear-out failure are compared in order to have a
better understanding of the real behavior of the system, where the
wear-out issue is more significant compared to the random failure.
Considering maintenance intervals, the availability of the system in-
creases in accordance with planned maintenance. Taking into account
the inspection intervals, another solution for decision makers to opti-
mize maintenance interval is to look at the inspection or monitoring
systems. The repair actions for critical components could make a huge
difference in the availability of the system. On the other hand, the
optimum maintenance intervals could be further investigated.
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